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Abstract
This thesis presents the development and study of two stochastic models. The first one
is an equilibrium model for a market involving risk-averse insider trading. In particular, the
static information model is considered under new assumptions: a) the insider is risk-averse,
b) the signal received by the insider is not necessarily Gaussian, and c) the price set by
the market maker is a function of a weighted signal that is not necessarily Gaussian either.
Conditions on the weighting and pricing functions ensuring the existence of equilibrium are
discussed. Equilibrium pricing and weighting functions as well as the insider’s optimal trad-
ing strategy are derived. Furthermore, the influence of the risk aversion on the equilibrium
outcome is investigated.
The second model studied, we derive the explicit solution to an impulse control problem
with non-linear penalisation of control expenditure. This solution has several features that
are not present in impulse control problems with affine penalisation of control effort. The
state dependence of the free-boundaries characterising the optimal strategy is the first one.
The possibility for the so-called continuation region to not be an interval and the optimal
strategy to involve multiple simultaneous jumps while the problem data is convex are further
such aspects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the first part of the thesis, we consider a new model of insider trading. The phenomenon
of insider trading in stock market has attracted significant interest from both economists and
mathematicians. The characterisation of the optimal strategy for an insider who possesses
superior information than general public has been widely studied in financial mathematics.
Especially with the development of enlargement of filtration by Jeulin and Yor [32], there
has been quite an interests studying models of insider trading, e.g., Ankirchner, Dereich and
Imkeller [2]. These papers have a common assumption: the insider’s trading amount will
not affect the market pricing dynamic.
On the other hand, assuming the opposite, consider “large investors”, Kyle [34] studied
the equilibrium model and showed the existence of unique linear equilibrium if the asset value
is Gaussian random variable. Under such equilibrium the price process is a Brownian motion
in market maker’s filtration and Brownian bridge in the insider’s filtration. Back [5] assumed
the price process to depend only on the cumulative order of the stocks. He considered the
model under continuous time trading where the insider can infer the cumulative trading
amount of noise traders by observing the price process continuously. Under such assump-
tions, he extended Kyle’s result and proved the existence of equilibrium beyond Gaussian
linear framework. Both Kyle and Back studied the risk neutral case where the insider has
linear utility function.
Cho [12] followed Back’s framework, considered risk averse cases where the insider has
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exponential utility function. He showed existence of equilibrium under Gaussian linear frame-
work. In addition, he allowed market maker to determine the price process depending not
only on the cumulative order of the asset, but also took into account the history of cumu-
lative order. From an economic sense, the more recent trade is better indicator to market
maker to determine the price of the asset.
Here, we follow Back’s framework, with continuous trading, and extend Cho’s results
to the risk averse case. In particular, for exponential utility, we characterise all optimal
strategies for the insider within a general, non-Gaussian framework. We also establish one
inconspicuous equilibrium that allows the insider to trade undetected by the market maker.
Moreover, we introduce the weighting function for market maker to determine the price
process depending on the paths of the cumulative order.
In the second part of the thesis, we consider a stochastic system whose state dynamics are
given by
Xt = x− Z¯t +Wt, for t ≥ 0,
where W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion and Z¯ is an impulsively controlled
process. In particular, the process Z¯ is given by
Z¯t =
∞∑
n=1
Zn1{τn<t},
where (τn) is the increasing sequence of stopping times at which impulsive action is applied
to the system and the positive real-valued random variables Zn, n ≥ 1, are the sizes of the
corresponding actions. In this context, the collection
Z = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, . . . ;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn, . . .)
fully characterises any admissible control strategy. The objective of the optimisation problem
that we study is to minimise the performance criterion
Jx(Z) = E
[
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)]
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over all strategies Z, where α, δ, κ, λ > 0 are given constants. The problem’s value function
is defined by
v(x) = inf
Z
Jx(Z), for x ∈ R.
The theory of stochastic impulse control has attracted considerable interest and has been
applied in several fields. In mathematical finance, economics and operations research, im-
portant contributions include Richard [51], Harrison, Sellke and Tayor [27], Mundaca and
Øksendal [43], Korn [35], Bar-Ilan, Sulem and Zanello [11], Bar-Ilan, Perry and Stadje [10],
Ohnishi and Tsujimura [47], Cadenillas and Zapatero [14], Cadenillas, Sarkar and Zapa-
tero [19], Cadenillas, Lakner and Pinedo [18], Feng and Muthuraman [25], Jeanblanc-Picque´
and Shiryaev [30], Alvarez and Lempa [4], and several references therein. Models motivated
by the optimal management of renewable resources have been studied by Alvarez [1], and
Alvarez and Koskela [3]. Also, the general mathematical theory of stochastic impulse control
is well-developed: see Lepeltier and Marchal [41], Perthame [48], Djehiche, Hamade`ne and
Hdhiri [21], as well as the books by Bensoussan and Lions [8], Øksendal and Sulem [46],
Pham [50], and several references therein.
In view of the general theory of stochastic impulse control, the value function of the
optimisation problem that we study identifies with a classical solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
min
{
1
2
w′′(x)− δw(x) + λx2, −w(x) + inf
z>0
[
w(x− z) + 1 + κzα]} = 0.
Our objective is to derive and characterise the solution to this quasi-variational inequality.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first impulse control problem with non-linear
penalisation of control expenditure that has been explicitly solved in the literature. It turns
out that its solution has features that have not been observed in the literature. These include
the state dependence of the free-boundaries characterising the optimal strategy as well as
the possibility for the so-called continuation region to not be an interval despite the problem
data being convex. Furthermore, it may be the case that minimal costs can be achieved only
by multiple simultaneous jumps, which implies that an optimal strategy may not exist.
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Chapter 2
Insider trading with static
information: impact of insider’s risk
aversion on equilibrium
2.1 Market Model
In this thesis, we model the market affected by private information. In particular, we consider
a company which released a risky asset (i.e. a claim on the company value). This asset is
assumed to be traded continuously. At some future time, assumed to be time 1 without loss
of generality1, the value of the company, V will become public. As all the agents will agree
on the value of the company, they also will agree on the price of the asset being V . For
simplicity, we assume no information release directly to the public between the beginning
of the market and time 1. If all the agents in the market are risk-neutral, this will imply
constant price until the information release and abrupt price adjustment at the moment of
information release.
1The choice of deterministic time of the information release has no impact on our market model, the
generalisation of any other time will be straightforward.
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To describe this model in rigorous terms, consider filtered probability space
(Ω,F, {Ft}t∈[0,1],Q),
satisfying the usual conditions. We assume that this probability space is large enough to
support a Brownian motions B as well as a normally distributed random variable Z which
is independent of B.
We assume there is a risk-less asset on the market and for simplicity we set interest rate
to zero. The price of the risky asset is determined by the company’s fundamental value
at time 1, V , which will be released at time 1. We assume V = f(Z) where the function
f : R→ R and random variable Z satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 We assume the fundamental price, V, satisfies:
1. f is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing.
2. |f | and |f ′| are bounded by constant K.
3. limx↓−∞ f ′(x) = limx↑∞ f ′(x) = 0.
4. Z = N(0, 1).
Remark 1 The assumption that f is strictly increasing implies that the larger the signal Z
the large the asset value. Since f is bounded, we immediately have E [f 2(Z)] < ∞, i.e., the
terminal price of the asset is in L2. Since f is strictly increasing and bounded, we have the
limits exist for f when x→ ±∞. Denote b and d to be the upper and lower limits of f , i.e.,
limx→−∞ f(x) = b and limx→∞ f(x) = d. By assuming V = f(Z) with above conditions, we
capture most random variables with smooth distribution functions for V .
The agents in the market are differentiated by the information they have access to, hence
by filtrations their actions are adapted to. In particular, we consider three types of agents
populating the market: noise trader, market maker and insider.
Noise Traders trade for reasons other than maximising their utilities, for example for
liquidity reasons by Grossman and Stiglitz [26] and we assume that their cumulative demand
follows a standard Brownian motion B.
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Market Maker observes total cumulated orders, which is the sum of orders from both
noise trader and informed trader, i.e., Yt = θt + Bt, where we denote the cumulative order
from the insider by time t to be θt. The admissible trading strategy of the insider, θ, will
be assumed to be an absolutely continuous process, thus Y is a continuous semimartingale
in (Ω,F, (Ft),Q). Then the market maker’s filtration at time t, FMt , is defined as FMt := FYt
for t ∈ [0, 1[ and FM1 := FY1 ∨ σ(Z).
The market maker sets the asset price, Pt. We define a weighted signal ξ of Y where ξ
satisfies the following SDE and initial condition:
dξt = w(t, ξt)dYt, ξ0 = 0 a.s., (2.1.1)
where w is called weighting function2 which satisfies admissibility conditions that we will
define shortly. In principle, P depends on the whole path of Y , i.e., the whole path of ξ.
For simplicity we assume Pt = ξt + c with some constant c for any t ∈ [0, 1[ and P1 = f(Z).
The admissibility conditions imposed on θ and w will ensure that SDE (2.1.1) will admit a
unique strong Markov solution. We will denote by P 0,z the time 0 law of the process ξ and
random variable Z. Now we consider the probability measure P defined on (Ω,FY1 ∨ σ(Z))
by
P(E) =
∫
R
P 0,z(E)µ(dz), ∀E ∈ FY1 ∨ σ(Z), (2.1.2)
which is the market maker’s measure. We will denote E, the expectation taken under market
maker’s measure and E0,z, the expectation taken under insider’s measure.
Insider observes the price process P up to any time t and distribution of Z at t = 0,
thus her filtration is given by FIt = F
P
t ∨σ(Z). Insider’s objective is to maximise the expected
utility of final wealth, i.e.:
sup
θ∈A(w)
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp{−γW θ1 }
]
,
where A(w), which will be specified later, is the set of admissible trading strategies given
the pricing rule (P,w). The expectation is taken under the measure P 0,z, which is the time
2We apply the weighting function as the market maker may wish to put price dependency more emphasised
on recent trades. This definition is a generalisation of [12] and [15].
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0 law of the coupled process ξ and signal Z. In reality, the insider observes the process P
and signal Z, we will show later in Remark 6 the equivalence of the filtrations FP ∨σ(Z) and
FY ∨ σ(Z). We use exponential utility function here with γ > 0. The ad-hoc reasoning for
choosing such utility function is discussed in Remark 7. We denote by W θ1 an insider’s wealth
at terminal time if she chooses to follow the admissible trading strategy θ. It is comprised of
the continuous gain over the time interval [0, 1[ and gain from the possible price discrepancy
at terminal time t = 1, i.e.
W θ1 =
∫ 1−
0
θtdPt + (f(Z)− P1−)θ1− . (2.1.3)
2.2 Admissibility and Equilibrium
The above market model suggests a feedback mechanism for the insider, as her trading
strategy will be reflected upon the asset price which in turn will influence her trading strategy
itself. In this thesis, we focus on finding the equilibrium of such market model in the sense:
1. given the pricing rule, insider’s trading strategy is optimal;
2. given the trading strategy, there exists a unique strong solution for SDE (2.1.1) over
[0, 1[ and the pricing rule is rational, i.e., martingale over [0, 1[.
To formalise the definition of equilibrium and rational pricing, we need to define the sets of
admissible pricing rules and admissible trading strategies.
Definition 1 Let b and d be the constants defined in Remark 1. An admissible pricing rule
is a measurable weighting function w and a constant c such that:
1. w ∈ C1,2
(
[0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[
)
is bounded and positive in the interior of its domain where
b˜ = b− c and d˜ = d− c.
2. The weighting function w ∈ C1,2 : [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R+ satisfies:
wt
w2
(t, ξ) +
wξξ(t, ξ)
2
= −γ (2.2.4)
for some positive γ ∈ R.
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3. There exists a unique strong solution ξ to the SDE (2.1.1) in (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,1[,P) such
that τ > 1 where τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : ξt /∈]b˜, d˜[} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt /∈]b, d[}.
The first condition is inherited from the boundedness of f , hence the boundedness of the
pricing signal ξ. The second condition is a necessary condition for the existence of optimal
strategy which we will show later in Lemma 1.
Definition 2 We will call an admissible pricing rule rational if it satisfies
Pt = E
[
f(Z)|FYt
]
for a given admissible trading strategy θ (we will define shortly in Definition 3 what an
admissible trading strategy is). In particular P1 = f(Z) and P0 = E[f(Z)] where expectation
is taken w.r.t. the probability measure P defined in (2.1.2).
Remark 2 We can use Bertrand undercutting argument to explain rational pricing. The
market maker sets the price to be equal to the expectation of the liquidation value of the asset,
conditional on his information set at the time the price is determined. Thus market maker
earn on average zero profit. Suppose there are several market makers and one of them is
aggressive and makes profit by setting the price higher than the rational price. As a result of
competition, other market makers will set price in-between the rational price and the price
set by the aggressive market maker. Over the time, prices will converge to rational price.
Remark 3 Suppose P is rational pricing rule where Pt = ξt + c. Since ξ satisfies the SDE
(2.1.1), we know it is local martingale. Moreover, since w is bounded, we know ξ is a true
martingale. Therefore
E[f(Z)] = P0 = ξ0 + c = c.
We will consider rational pricing P with c = E[f(Z)] without loss of generality. As discussed
in the previous remark, we have P is bounded by the range ]b, d[. We immediately have
E[
∫ 1
0
P 2t dt] < ∞. As we are taking expectation under market maker’s measure, this means
the process P ∈ L2 from market maker’s point of view, i.e., without the existence of the
insider.
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Remark 4 We will show that the rational price process P is bounded with a state space ]b, d[,
where b and d are the constants in Remark 1. In other words, condition 3 of Definition 1
is not restricting our choice of weighting function w. Indeed, as stated in the Remark 3,
Pt ∈ [b, d] a.s. for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the continuity of the process P implies that its state
space is at most [b, d].
Consider a stopping time τb := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt = b} ∧ 1. As process P is a martingale
that is closed by the random variable f(Z), optional sampling theorem (e.g. Theorem I.16
in Protter [49]) implies that
E[f(Z)1τb<1|FYτb ] = E[f(Z)|FYτb ]1τb<1 = Pτb1τb<1 = b1τb<1.
Therefore,
bP[τb < 1] = E[f(Z)1τb<1] = E[f(Z)1τb<11f(Z)=b + f(Z)1τb<11f(Z)>b]
= E[b1τb<1 + (f(Z)− b)1τb<11f(Z)>b]
= bP[τb < 1] + E[(f(Z)− b)1τb<11f(Z)>b].
This yields that E[(f(Z) − b)1τb<11f(Z)>b] = 0 and, since (f(Z) − b)1τb<11f(Z)>b is non-
negative random variable, that (f(Z)− b)1τb<11f(Z)>b = 0 a.s.. Observe that
0 = P[(f(Z)− b)1τb<11f(Z)>b > 0] = P[τb < 1, f(Z) > b] = P[τb < 1],
where the last equality follows from the fact that
P[f(Z) > b] = P[Z > −∞] = 1,
since by the definition of f (and, in particular, Remark 1) f(z) = b ⇔ z = −∞, and Z is
normally distributed.
Similar consideration applies to τd := inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt = d} ∧ 1, and therefore τ := inf{t ≥
0 : Pt /∈]b, d[} ∧ 1 = 1 a.s.. This, together with the fact that
P[f(Z) ∈]b, d[] = P[−∞ < Z < +∞] = 1,
yields the desired conclusion.
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Remark 5 We want to show that choosing P = ξ+E[f(Z)] is in line with the conventional
pricing assumption and provide a brief ad-hoc proof of why we choose P to be linear. Assume
we have an alternative pricing rule that Pt = H(t, ζt) for t ∈ [0, 1[ where H is a strictly
increasing function w.r.t. the space variable. Therefore H−1 is well defined. ζ is the solution
to the SDE dζ = a(t, ζt)dYt and ζ0 = 0 a.s. where a is strictly positive in the interior of its
domain.
Apply Ito’s formula on process P stopped at τn where τn = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pt /∈]b+ 1n , d− 1n [},
denote P nt = Pt∧τn and ζ
n
t = ζt∧τn, we have:
P nt = P0 +
∫ t∧τn
0
(
Hs(s, ζ
n
s ) +
a2(s, ζns )
2
Hζζ(s, ζ
n
s )
)
ds+
∫ t∧τn
0
Hζ(s, ζ
n
s )a(s, ζ
n
s )dβs
=
∫ t∧τn
0
(
Hs(s,H
−1(s, P ns )) +
a2(s,H−1(s, P ns ))
2
Hζζ(s,H
−1(s, P ns ))
)
ds
+
∫ t∧τn
0
Hζ(s,H
−1(s, P ns ))a(s,H
−1(s, P ns ))dβs +H(0, ζ0)
Since limn→∞ τn = τ > 1 due to Remark 4, we have the above equality is true for any
t ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose P is rational pricing, we have Pt = H(t, ζt) = E
[
f(Z)|FYt
]
. Therefore,
we know P is a martingale in its own filtration. Thus the drift term must be zero, i.e.,
Ht(t, y) +
a2(t, y)
2
Hyy(t, y) = 0, t ∈ [0, 1]. (2.2.5)
Therefore
Pt =
∫ t
0
Hy(s,H
−1(t, Ps))a(s,H−1(t, Ps))dβs +H(0, ζ0)
=
∫ t
0
Hy(s,H
−1(t, Ps))a(s,H−1(t, Ps))dβs + E[f(Z)].
Since this pricing rule is equivalent to the linear model, we have w(t, x) = Hy(t,H
−1(t, x −
E[f(Z)]))a(t,H−1(t, x − E[f(Z)])) and ξ as the solution of the SDE dξt = w(t, ξt)dβt with
initial condition ξ0 = 0 a.s. as Pt = ξt + E[f(Z)]. In other words, the alternative weighting
function a is given by:
a(t, y) =
w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
Hy(t, y)
.
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We will show that a satisfies a similar PDE w satisfies which is inline with the PDE (2.3.6)
we derived in Remark 7. Differentiate a w.r.t. t and y, we have:
at(t, y) =
wt(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)]) + wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Ht(t, y)
Hy(t, y)
−w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hty(t, y)
H2y (t, y)
,
ay(t, y) = wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])− w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hyy(t, y)
H2y (t, y)
,
ayy(t, y) = wxx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hy(t, y) +
2w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])H2yy(t, y)
H3y (t, y)
−wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hy(t, y)Hyy(t, y) + w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hyyy(t, y)
H2y (t, y)
.
Therefore, we have
L(a) =
at(t, y)
a2(t, y)
+
ayy(t, y)
2
=
(wt(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)]) + wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Ht(t, y))Hy(t, y)
w2(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
− Hty(t, y)
w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
+
wxx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hy(t, y)
2
−wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hy(t, y)Hyy(t, y) + w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hyyy(t, y)
2H2y (t, y)
+
w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])H2yy(t, y)
H3y (t, y)
= Hy(t, y)
(
wt(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
w2(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
+
wxx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
2
)
+
wx(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])Hy(t, y)
w2(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
(
Ht(t, y) +
a2(t, y)
2
Hyy(t, y)
)
− 1
w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
(
Ht(t, y) +
a2(t, y)
2
Hyy(t, y)
)
y
= −γHy(t, y).
This is the same PDE we derive later in Remark 7. Therefore, we have the equivalence of
the following pricing rules:
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1. Pricing rule Pt = ξt + E[f(Z)] and weighting function w satisfying (2.2.4) where ξ is
strong solution of SDE dξt = w(t, ξt)dYt, ξ0 = 0 a.s..
2. Pricing rule Pt = H(t, ζt) (H satisfies PDE (2.2.5), H(0, 0) = E[f(Z)]) and weighting
function a satisfying (2.3.6) where ζ is strong solution of SDE dζt = w(t, ζt)dYt, ζ0 = 0
a.s..
Moreover, if we have w, and pricing rule H, the corresponding weighting function a will be
given by
a(t, y) =
w(t,H(t, y) + E[f(Z)])
Hy(t, y)
.
On the other hand if we have w and weighting function a, the corresponding pricing rule will
be given by
Hy(t, y) = −1
γ
(
at(t, y)
a2(t, y)
+
ayy(t, y)
2
)
,
H(t, y) = w−1 (t, a(t, y)Hy(t, y))− E[f(Z)].
Thus without loss of generality, we only need to solve for the linear case where Pt = ξt +
E[f(Z)] and corresponding weighting function w satisfying (2.2.4).
Remark 6 We also would like to justify by choosing P (effectively ξ) over Y as market
maker’s pricing signal, we are not losing any information. As straightforwardly by the SDE
defined in (2.1.1) we have Fξ ⊆ FY . Since b˜ = b−E[f(Z)] ≤ 0 with equality when f(Z) = b
P-a.s., d˜ = d − E[f(Z)] ≥ 0 with equality when f(Z) = d P-a.s.. The initial condition of
ξ0 = 0 ∈]b˜, d˜[. We define for ∀x ∈]b˜, d˜[:
A(t, x) =
∫ x
0
dy
w(t, y)
+
∫ t
0
1
2
wx(s, 0)ds,
a strictly increasing function w.r.t. x. Therefore A−1(t, y) exists and is well defined. From
the definition, we calculate for ∀x ∈]b˜, d˜[:
Ax(t, x) =
1
w(t, x)
,
At(t, x) +
w2(t, x)
2
Axx = −
∫ x
0
wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
dy +
1
2
wx(t, 0)− 1
2
wx(t, x)
= −
∫ x
0
(
wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
+
wyy(t, y)
2
)
dy.
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Denote ηt = A(t, ξt). Apply Ito’s formula to process η stopped at time τn where τn = inf{t ≥
0 : Pt /∈]b + 1n , d − 1n [} = inf{t ≥ 0 : ξt /∈]b˜ + 1n , d˜ − 1n [}, denote ηnt = ηt∧τn and Y nt = Yt∧τn,
we have
ηnt =
∫ t∧τn
0
Ax(s, ξ
n
s )dξ
n
s +
∫ t∧τn
0
(
As(s, ξ
n
s ) +
w2(s, ξns )
2
Axx(s, ξ
n
s )
)
ds
= Y nt −
∫ t∧τn
0
(∫ A−1(s,ηns )
0
(
ws(s, y)
w2(s, y)
+
wyy(s, y)
2
)
dy
)
ds.
Since limn→∞ τn = τ > 1 due to Remark 4, we have
Yt = ηt +
∫ t
0
(∫ A−1(s,ηs)
0
(
ws(s, y)
w2(s, y)
+
wyy(s, y)
2
)
dy
)
ds,
i.e., Yt solely depends on η[0,t]. Therefore F
Y ⊆ Fη for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover since A(t, x)
is invertible w.r.t. space variable and is continuous, we have Fη = Fξ. Thus FY ⊆ Fξ.
Combining with previous result that Fξ ⊆ FY , we have FY = Fξ. Hence the insider’s
filtration is equivalently generated by processes Y and σ(Z), i.e., insider has full information
of the market.
The definition of admissible strategy θ is based on the set of admissible pricing rule w.
Back [5] proved that any strategy as a discontinuous process or with nonzero martingale part
is strictly suboptimal. We also limit admissible trading strategies to absolutely continuous
set. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3 An admissible trading strategy θ ∈ A(w) for insider given any admissible
pricing rule is Fξ ∨ σ(Z) adapted process satisfying:
1. θ is absolutely continuous, i.e., dθt = αtdt.
2. There exists a unique strong solution of SDE (2.1.1) in (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,1[,Q).
3. (ξ, Z) is a Markov process adapted to (Ft) with measure P
0,z;
We already have E0,z
[∫ 1
0
Ptdt
]
<∞ since P is bounded process. Thus doubling strategies
are eliminated since the admissible trading strategies are restricted in L2. (see Duffie and
Huang (1985) [20]).
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In addition, the insider will prefer not to be detected by the market maker. In this
case, she will hide her trading among the noise traders. Therefore, we only consider the
inconspicuous strategies for the insider.
Definition 4 We will call an admissible pricing strategy inconspicuous if
E[θs|Fξt ] = 0
for every 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ 1.
Thus the cumulative trading amount Yt = Bt + θt will appear as a local martingale in
market maker’s filtration. Moreover, since θ is absolutely continuous, quadratic variation
does not depend on the filtration, we have 〈Y 〉t = 〈B〉t = t. Thus we know Y is a local
martingale in Fξ with 〈Y 〉t = t. By Levy’s characterisation, Y is a Fξ Brownian motion. Now
we can formally define the market equilibrium given the definitions on admissible pricing
rules and admissible trading strategies.
Definition 5 An equilibrium of the insider is a pair (w∗, θ∗) s.t., w∗, an admissible pricing
rule, and θ∗ ∈ A(w∗), an admissible strategy satisfying:
1. w∗ is a rational pricing rule given θ∗.
2. θ∗ is insider’s optimal trading strategy, i.e.,
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp
{−γW θ∗1 }] = sup
θ∈A(w∗)
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp
{−γW θ1}] .
In this thesis, we focus on existence of equilibrium in which the insider trading strategy is
inconspicuous. We will call an equilibrium with this property an inconspicuous equilibrium.
2.3 Characterisation of Insider’s Optimal Strategy
The following Lemma characterises the insider’s optimal strategy. For simplicity we denote
f˜(x) = f(x) − E[f(Z)] where f will satisfy all the conditions in Assumption 1. Moreover,
we have limx→∞ f˜(x) = d˜ = d− E[f(Z)] and limx→−∞ f˜(x) = b˜ = b− E[f(Z)].
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Lemma 1 Suppose the rational pricing rule w satisfies the following condition: θ∗ ∈ A(w)
satisfies ξ∗1 = f˜(z) P
0,z − a.s. for every z ∈ R, where ξ∗ is the strong solution to the SDE
ξt =
∫ t
0
w(s, ξs)dY
∗
s , ξ0 = 0 a.s. with Y
∗ = B + θ∗. Then θ∗ is the optimal strategy, i.e., for
any θ ∈ A(w),
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp{−γW θ∗1 }
]
≥ E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp{−γW θ1 }
]
.
Proof.
We will adapt Wu’s proof of his Lemma 4.2 in [54].
Due to Remark 4, we have that ξt ∈]b˜, d˜[ a.s. for any t ∈ [0, 1], thus we can define the
following function for any ξ ∈]b˜, d˜[:
ϕ(t, ξ) =
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
y − f˜(z)
w(t, y)
dy +
1
2
∫ 1
t
w(s, f˜(z))ds.
Since w ∈ C1,2([0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R) and w(t, x) > 0, ϕ(t, ξ) is well defined in C1,2([0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→
R). The idea of defining such a function comes from the solution of HJB equations and ϕ
will be used to give an upper bound of the insider’s expected terminal utility.
First we derive some important properties of ϕ. Differentiate ϕ w.r.t. ξ to second order
we have
ϕξ(t, ξ) =
ξ − f˜(z)
w(t, ξ)
, ϕξξ =
1
w(t, ξ)
− [ξ − f˜(z)]wξ(t, ξ)
w2(t, ξ)
.
Differentiate ϕ w.r.t. t we have
ϕt(t, ξ) =
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
−(y − f˜(z))wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
dy − 1
2
w(t, f˜(z)).
Note by Leibniz integral rule, we can move derivative inside the integral provided the inte-
grand and derivative of the integrand are continuous functions over the integral intervals. In
this case, − (y−f˜(z))wt(t,y)
w2(t,y)
is continuous function given the differentiability of w. Therefore,
I = ϕt(t, ξ) +
w2(t, ξ)
2
ϕξξ(t, ξ)
=
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
−(y − f˜(z))wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
dy − 1
2
w(t, f˜(z)) +
1
2
w(t, ξ)− 1
2
(ξ − f˜(z))wξ(t, ξ)
= −
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
(y − f˜(z))
(
wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
+
wyy(t, y)
2
)
dy +
1
2
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
(y − f˜(z))wyy(t, y)dy − 1
2
w(t, f˜(z))
+
1
2
w(t, ξ)− 1
2
(ξ − f˜(z))wξ(t, ξ).
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Integration by parts of the second integral we have
J =
1
2
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
(y − f˜(z))wyy(t, y)dy
=
1
2
(y − f˜(z))wy(t, y)|ξf˜(z) −
1
2
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
wy(t, y)dy
=
1
2
(ξ − f˜(z))wξ(t, ξ)− 1
2
w(t, ξ) +
1
2
w(t, f˜(z)).
Substitute into the equation of I we have
I = −
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
(y − f˜(z))
(
wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
+
wyy(t, y)
2
)
dy.
Due to condition (2.2.4), we have
ϕt(t, ξ) +
w2(t, ξ)
2
ϕξξ(t, ξ) = γ
∫ ξ
f˜(z)
(y − f˜(z))dy = γ
2
(ξ − f˜(z))2.
We apply Ito’s formula on ϕ(t, ξt) stopped at τn where τn = inf{t ≥ 0 : ξt /∈ (b˜+ 1n , d˜− 1n)},
denote ξnt = ξt∧τn :
ϕ(t, ξnt )− ϕ(0, 0) =
∫ t∧τn
0
ϕξ(s, ξ
n
s )dξ
n
s +
∫ t∧τn
0
(
ϕs(s, ξ
n
s ) +
w2(s, ξns )
2
ϕξξ(s, ξ
n
s )
)
ds
=
∫ t∧τn
0
ξns − f˜(z)
w(s, ξns )
dξns +
γ
2
∫ t∧τn
0
(ξns − f˜(z))2ds.
Taking the limit n → ∞, we have τn → τ > 1 due to the condition 3 of Definition 1, the
admissible pricing rule. Therefore we have the above expression holds for any t ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
ϕ(t, ξt)− ϕ(0, 0) =
∫ t
0
ξs − f˜(z)
w(s, ξs)
dξs +
γ
2
∫ t
0
(ξs − f˜(z))2ds.
In addition, we have the boundary condition
ϕ(1, ξ1) =
∫ ξ1
f˜(z)
y − f˜(z)
w(1, y)
dy ≥ 0.
To see this, if ξ1 > f˜(z), then y > f˜(z) for all y ∈ [f˜(z), ξ1], hence integral is positive On the
other hand, if ξ1 < f˜(z), then y < f˜(z) for all y ∈ [ξ1, f˜(z)], hence integral is also positive.
Equality holds if and only if ξ1 = f˜(z).
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The wealth process of the insider at terminal time is W1. Apply integration by part to
W θ1 defined in (2.1.3), we have
W θ1 =
∫ 1−
0
θtdξt + (f(Z)− (ξ1− + E[f(Z)])) θ1−
=
∫ 1−
0
θtdξt + (f˜(Z)− ξ1−)θ1−
= θ1−ξ1− − [θ, ξ]1− +
∫ 1−
0
ξtdθt + (f˜(Z)− ξ1−)θ1−
=
∫ 1−
0
(f˜(Z)− ξt)dθt =
∫ 1
0
(f˜(Z)− ξt)dθt.
In the above calculation, [θ, ξ]1− = 0 since θ is absolutely continuous process. The last
equality is due to continuity of process ξ.
Therefore the insider’s expected wealth:
R = sup
θ
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp
{−γW θ1}]
= −1
γ
inf
θ
E0,z
[
exp
{
−γ
∫ 1
0
(f˜(z)− ξt)dθ
}]
= −1
γ
inf
θ
E0,z
[
exp
{
γ
∫ 1
0
ξt − f˜(z)
w(t, ξt)
dξt − γ
∫ 1
0
(ξt − f˜(z))dBt
}]
.
The last equality is due to dξ = w(t, ξ)(dBt + dθt). Substitute Ito’s formula on ϕ(t, ξt) into
the above equation, we have
R = −1
γ
inf
θ
E0,z
[
exp
{
−γϕ(0, 0) + γϕ(1, ξ1)− γ
∫ 1
0
(ξt − f˜(z))dBt − γ
2
2
∫ 1
0
(ξt − f˜(z))2dt
}]
≤ −exp {−γϕ(0, 0)}
γ
inf
θ
E0,z
[
Eθ1
]
since ϕ(1, ξ1) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if ξ1 = f˜(z) a.s..
Eθt = exp
{
−γ
∫ t
0
(ξs − f˜(z))dBs − γ
2
2
∫ t
0
(ξs − f˜(z))2ds
}
is an Fξ,Z exponential local martingale with E0 = 1.
Since |f | and |f ′| are bounded by K, suppose |f˜ | and |f˜ ′| are bounded by K˜. By rational
pricing rule Definition 2, we know ξt = E[f˜(Z)|Fξt ] is bounded by K˜ for any t ∈ [0, 1]. The
19
Novikov’s condition is satisfied since
E0,z exp
{
γ
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣ξt − f˜(z)∣∣∣2 dt} ≤ exp{4γK˜2} <∞.
Thus it is a true martingale and in particular E0,z
[
Eθ1
]
= E0,z [E0] = 1. Therefore the
insider’s expected utility satisfies
E0,z
[
−1
γ
exp
{−γW θ1}] ≤ E0,z [−1γ exp{−γW θ∗1 }
]
=
exp {−γϕ(0, 0)}
γ
.
Equality holds when θ∗ ∈ A(w) satisfies ξ∗1 = f˜(z) P 0,z-a.s. 
We introduce the following ad hoc derivation towards our consideration of exponential
utility above. It gives us an insightful, yet not rigorous justification of the reason we choose
exponential utility to study.
Remark 7 In this remark, we consider general pricing rule (H, a) where Pt = H(t, ζ), ζ is
the strong solution to SDE dζt = a(t, ζt)dYt, ζ0 = 0 a.s., Yt = Bt + θt is Brownian motion
in its own filtration due to inconspicuous trading. Our aim is the following, given (H, a)
satisfying (2.2.5) which is due to rational pricing in Remark 5, find out under which utility
functions there exists equilibrium and what other conditions (H, a) need to satisfy.
We know the terminal wealth W θ1 =
∫ 1
0
(f(Z)−H(t, ζt)) dθt. Define process X satisfying
dXt = (f(Z)−H(t, ζt))dθt, X0 = 0 a.s..
Xt is an F
ζ ∨ σ(Z) adapted process. The insider is trying to maximize the expected utility of
terminal wealth, i.e., supθ E0,z[W θ1 ]. We can define:
v(t, x, ζ, θ) = E0,zt
[
u
(
x+
∫ 1
t
(f(z)−H(s, ζs))dθs
)]
,
where u ∈ C3 is strictly increasing concave utility function. Define the conditional value
function φ(t, ζ, x):
φ(t, ζ, x) = sup
θ∈A(H,a)
v(t, x, ζ, θ),
where A(H, a) is the set of admissible trading strategy given pricing rule (H, a). The Bell-
man’s optimality principle, introduced by El Karoui [33] suggests the process φ(t, ζ,X) be a
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supermartingale for any θ ∈ A(H, a) and a martingale if and only if θ is optimal. By Ito’s
formula
dφ(t, ζt, Xt) = φζ(t, ζt, Xt)a(t, ζt)dBt + φx(t, ζt, Xt)(f(z)−H(t, ζt))dθt
+
(
φt(t, ζt, Xt) +
a2(t, ζt)
2
φζζ(t, ζt, Xt)
)
dt.
The drift term is negative for supermartingale and zero for martingale when θ is the optimal
strategy, hence
0 = φt(t, ζ, x) +
a2(t, ζ)
2
φζζ(t, ζ, x)
+ sup
θ∈A(H,w)
[φζ(t, ζ, x)a(t, ζ) + φx(t, ζ, x)(f(z)−H(t, ζ))] dθ
dt
.
Notice that the Bellman equation is linear in dθ
dt
and has a solution if and only if
φt(t, ζ, x) +
a2(t, ζ)
2
φζζ(t, ζ, x) = 0,
φζ(t, ζ, x)a(t, ζ) + φx(t, ζ, x)(f(z)−H(t, ζ)) = 0
with boundary condition φ(1, ζ, x) = u(x). Differentiate the above PDEs w.r.t. ζ and t
respectively we have
φtζ(t, ζ, x) = −a(t, ζ)aζ(t, ζ)φζζ(t, ζ, x)− a
2(t, ζ)
2
φζζζ(t, ζ, x),
φζt(t, ζ, x) =
φxt(t, ζ, x)(H(t, ζ)− f(z)) + φx(t, ζ, x)Ht(t, ζ)
a(t, ζ)
−at(t, ζ)φx(t, ζ, x)(H(t, ζ)− f(z))
a2(t, ζ)
.
Let φxt(t, ζ, x) = φtx(t, ζ, x), φζζx(t, ζ, x) = φxζζ(t, ζ, x) and finally φtζ(t, ζ, x) = φζt(t, ζ, x)
due to continuity, we can use (2.2.5) to simplify the above equations to satisfy the following
condition:
φxx(t, ζ, x)
φx(t, ζ, x)
=
1
Hζ(t, ζ)
(
at(t, ζ)
a2(t, ζ)
+
aζζ(t, ζ)
2
)
= −γ(t, ζ) (2.3.6)
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1. If γ = 0 we have φxx = 0. Therefore we have φ(t, ζ, x) = A(t, ζ)x + B(t, ζ). Apply
boundary condition φ(1, ζ, x) = u(x) = A(1, ζ)x+B(1, ζ). We conclude that only linear
utility case (w.l.o.g. u(x) = x) applies.
2. If γ = γ(t, ζ) we have φ(t, ζ, x) = A(t, ζ) exp {−γ(t, ζ)x} + B(t, ζ). Apply boundary
condition φ(1, ζ, x) = u(x) = A(1, ζ) exp {−γ(1, ζ)x}+B(1, ζ), i.e., γ(1, ζ) = const. =
γ, A(1, ζ) and B(1, ζ) are both constants. This imply the exponential utility case.
Without loss of generality u(x) = − 1
γ
e−γx where γ > 0 due to concavity of utility
function.
The linear utility case has been widely studied and will not be the focus of this paper. We
conclude that given (H, a) satisfying (2.2.5), Bellman’s optimality principle suggests (2.3.6)
and u(x) = − 1
γ
e−γx are the necessary conditions for the existence of the conditional value
function. This ad-hoc derivation inspires us to consider equilibrium under above exponential
utility.
From previous section we obtained the sufficient conditions for insider’s strategy to be
optimal given suitable conditions on pricing w. Now we provide the following sufficient
condition for (w∗, θ∗) to be an inconspicuous equilibrium.
Lemma 2 A triplet (P ∗, w∗, θ∗) where w∗ is an admissible pricing rule and θ∗ ∈ A(w∗), is
an inconspicuous equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Y ∗t = Bt + θ
∗
t is a standard Brownian motion in its own filtration.
2. ξ∗1 = f˜(z), P
0,z − a.s. for every z ∈ R and ξ∗ is the strong solution to ξt =∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξs)dY ∗s on (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,1[,P) with initial condition ξ0 = 0 a.s..
3. P ∗ = ξ∗ + E[f(Z)] is an (FY ∗)-martingale w.r.t. P.
Proof. Suppose (P ∗, w∗, θ∗) is a triplet satisfying conditions 1 to 3 in the statement
of the Lemma.
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Condition 1 ensures that the insider’s trading strategy is inconspicuous since the total
order is a Brownian motion in market maker’s filtration. Conditions 2 and 3 imply that the
pricing rule w∗ is rational in the sense that
P ∗t = ξ
∗
t + E[f(Z)] = E[ξ∗1 | FY
∗
t ] + E[f(Z)]
= E[f(Z)− E[f(Z)] | FY ∗t ] + E[f(Z)] = E[f(Z) | FY
∗
t ]
where the second equality is due to martingale property of ξ∗ by condition 3, the third
equality is due to the convergence of the terminal distribution by condition 2 and last equality
is by tower property.
Finally, by Lemma 1, conditions 2 imply that θ∗ is optimal.

By condition 2 of the above Lemma, ξ∗ need to have required terminal distribution of
f(Z), this effectively put the condition on w∗ as ξ∗t =
∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξs)dY ∗s where Y
∗ is a standard
Brownian motion by condition 1. The following subsection discuss the existence of such
pricing rule.
2.4 Existence of Pricing Rule
Now we discuss the existence of w∗ for equilibrium. For brevity we will drop the asterisk in
this sub-section. The market maker has to solve PDE (2.2.4) and
ξ1
d
= f˜(Z). (2.4.7)
Provided ξ is the strong solution to SDE
dξt = w(t, ξt)dβt, ξ0 = 0 a.s.
and β is a P standard Brownian motion. The following proposition gives sufficient conditions
for existence of w(t, x) ∈ C1,2 : [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R+ such that there exists unique strong solution
to the above SDE (2.4.12) with required terminal distribution (2.4.7) and w solves the PDE
(2.2.4) .
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Proposition 1 Consider function f˜ = f−E[f(Z)] where f satisfies Assumption 1 and such
that E[f˜(Z)] = 0. Define limx→∞ f˜(x) = d˜, and limx→−∞ f˜(x) = b˜.
Suppose there exists λ(t, x) ∈ C1,3 : [0, 1]× R→]b˜, d˜[ such that
1. λ is bounded, strictly increasing, limx→±∞ λx(t, x) = 0 and
lim
x→−∞
λ(t, x) = b˜, lim
x→∞
λ(t, x) = d˜.
2. λ satisfies the Burger’s equation:
λt(t, x) +
1
2
λxx(t, x) = −γλ(t, x)λx(t, x). (2.4.8)
3. λ satisfies the boundary condition:
λ(1, x) = f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P (1, x) (2.4.9)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of N(0, 1) and P is the CDF of
κt with κ being the unique strong solution of
dκt = dβt + γλ(t, κt)dt (2.4.10)
with initial condition κ0 = 0 a.s..
4. λ satisfies the initial condition λ(0, 0) = 0.
Then the weighting function w given by:
w(t, y) =
1
∂λ−1
∂y
(t, y)
(2.4.11)
is well defined and w(t, y) ∈ C1,2 : [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R+. It will satisfy the following:
1. w is positive in the interior of its domain, limy↓b˜w(t, y) = limy↑d˜w(t, y) = 0 for any
t ∈ [0, 1].
2. For any ξ ∈]b˜, d˜[, ξt = λ(t, κt) is a unique strong solution for SDE
dξt = w(t, ξt)dβt, (2.4.12)
with initial condition ξ0 = 0 a.s.. Moreover, the stopping τ := inf{t > 0 : ξt /∈]b˜, d˜[}
satisfies τ > 1 a.s..
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3. wt(t,ξ)
w(t,ξ)2
+
wξξ(t,ξ)
2
= −γ with boundary condition ξ1 d= f˜(Z).
Please refer to Appendix for proof. The sketch of the proof is as follows: we begin by
proving w defined by (2.4.11) is well-defined and satisfies the properties in statement 1 for
w due to condition 1 for λ. Secondly, due to ξt = λ(t, κt) we can apply Ito’s formula to
obtain the SDE for ξ as in statement 2 for w. Stopping time τ > 1 is due to the process
κ being non-explosive since its drift is bounded. Thirdly the SDE for w in statement 3 for
w is shown by substituting (2.4.11) into Burger’s equation satisfied by λ due to condition
2. Finally the boundary condition of ξ1 is satisfied due to condition 3 and 4 of λ and the
definition ξt = λ(t, κt). Therefore to show existence of the rational pricing rule w, it is
sufficient to demonstrate existence of solutions for the Burger’s equation (2.4.8) and (2.4.9)
where P is the CDF of κt and κ is the unique strong solution of (2.4.10). We can further
relax the sufficient condition to existence of solution of an integral equation.
Lemma 3 Consider function f˜ = f−E[f(Z)] where f satisfies Assumption 1 and such that
E[f˜(Z)] = 0. Define limx→∞ f˜(x) = d˜, and limx→−∞ f˜(x) = b˜. Define
lim
x→∞
f˜(x) = d˜ > 0, lim
x→−∞
f˜(x) = b˜ < 0.
Let P˜ ∈ C2 : R → (0, 1) be a function strictly increasing w.r.t. x, with P˜ (−∞) = 0 and
P˜ (∞) = 1. It also satisfies the integral equation:
P˜ (x) =
c∗√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γ
∫ u
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− u
2
2
}
du.
Then
λ(t, x) :=
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], (2.4.13)
where Γ(t, x) = 1√
2pi(1−t) exp
{
− x2
2(1−t)
}
, is well defined, continuously differentiable with re-
spect to the space variable on [0, 1]×R and infinitely continuously differentiable on [0, 1[×R.
Moreover, λx(t, x) is uniformly bounded and at terminal time we have
λ(1, x) = f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x).
Such defined λ satisfies all conditions of Proposition 1. Furthermore, P (1, x) = P˜ (x) where
P (t, x) is the CDF of κt satisfying the SDE (2.4.10).
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Proof. We will first show that λ given by (2.4.13) is well defined and has the degree
of regularity as stated.
Indeed, consider a PDE
ut(t, x) +
uxx(t, x)
2
= 0 (2.4.14)
with the terminal condition
u(1, x) = exp
{∫ x
0
γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du
}
.
As f˜ is bounded, the terminal condition has at most exponential growth, and therefore
Theorem 1.12 in [24] yields that there exits a classical solution to this Cauchy problem on
[0, 1] (note that we can take h as small as needed in this theorem). Moreover, the solution,
u, is given by
u(t, x) =
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy ∀t ∈ [0, 1[.
Note that u ∈ C([0, 1]× R) as the solution of the Cauchy problem. Furthermore, Theorem
9.10 in [24] yields that u ∈ C∞([0, 1[×R).
Thus, ux(t, x) is well-defined and continuous on [0, 1[×R. Moreover, for any (t, x) ∈
[0, 1[×R we will have (differentiation under the integral sign is justified as ∣∣ ∂
∂x
Γ(t, x− y)∣∣ =
|x−y|
1−t Γ(t, x− y) and u(1, y) < eK˜|y| where K˜ is the upper bound for |f˜ | and |f˜ ′|)
ux(t, x) =
∫
R
∂
∂x
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy = −
∫
R
∂
∂y
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y) |∞−∞ −
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy.
Note that the last integral is well defined as |uy(1, y)| ≤ K˜eK˜|y| since |f˜ | is bounded by
constant K˜. Moreover,
0 ≤ lim
y→±∞
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y) ≤ lim
y→±∞
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(x− y)
2
2(1− t) + γK˜|y|
}
= 0.
As |uy(1, y)| ≤ K˜eK˜|y|, Theorem 1.12 in [24] yields that
ux(t, x) = −
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy (2.4.15)
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is a solution to the PDE (2.4.14) with the terminal condition
ux(1, x) = γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) exp
{∫ x
0
γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du
}
.
In particular, ux ∈ C([0, 1] × R) and, in view of Theorem 9.10 in [24], ux ∈ C∞([0, 1[×R).
Furthermore,
u(t, x) =
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy ≥
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)e−K˜|y|dy
=
∫ 0
−∞
Γ(t, x− y)e−K˜|y|dy +
∫ ∞
0
Γ(t, x− y)e−K˜|y|dy = I1(t, x) + I2(t, x),
I1(t, x) =
∫ 0
−∞
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(x− y)
2
2(1− t) + K˜y
}
dy
= exp
{
K˜x+
K˜2(1− t)
2
}∫ 0
−∞
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(y − (x+ K˜(1− t)))
2
2(1− t) dy
}
= exp
{
K˜x+
K˜2(1− t)
2
}
Φ
√
1−t(−x− K˜(1− t)),
I2(t, x) =
∫ ∞
0
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(x− y)
2
2(1− t) − K˜y
}
dy
= exp
{
−K˜x+ K˜
2(1− t)
2
}∫ ∞
0
1√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(y − (x− K˜(1− t)))
2
2(1− t) dy
}
= exp
{
−K˜x+ K˜
2(1− t)
2
}
Φ
√
1−t(−x+ K˜(1− t)).
Therefore, for any x > K˜(1− t), we have
u(t, x) ≥ I2(t, x) > 1
2
exp
{
−K˜x+ K˜
2(1− t)
2
}
,
and for any x < K˜(1− t), we have
u(t, x) ≥ I1(t, x) > 1
2
exp
{
K˜x+
K˜2(1− t)
2
}
.
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Due to continuity of u, the function defined by
λ(t, x) =
ux(t, x)
γu(t, x)
, ∀t ∈ [0, 1],
is well-defined, continuous on [0, 1]×R and infinitely continuously differentiable on [0, 1[×R.
To establish that λx is continuous on [0, 1]× R, observe that
λx(t, x) =
uxx(t, x)u(t, x)− (ux(t, x))2
γu2(t, x)
is well defined on [0, 1]×R. Moreover, since both u and ux are continuous on [0, 1]×R and
u is strictly positive, the continuity of λx will follow from the continuity of uxx. Note that
from (2.4.15) we have (differentiation under the integral sign is justified as
∣∣ ∂
∂x
Γ(t, x− y)∣∣ =
|x−y|
1−t Γ(t, x− y) and |uy(1, y)| < K˜eK˜|y|)
uxx(t, x) = −
∫
R
∂
∂x
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy =
∫
R
∂
∂y
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy
= −Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y) |∞−∞ +
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uyy(1, y)dy
=
∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uyy(1, y)dy. (2.4.16)
The last equality is due to
0 ≤ lim
y→±∞
Γ(t, x− y)|uy(1, y)| ≤ lim
y→±∞
K˜√
2pi(1− t) exp
{
−(x− y)
2
2(1− t) + γK˜|y|
}
= 0,
And the
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)uyy(1, y)dy is well defined as we have
|uxx(1, x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
[(
γf˜(Φ−1(P˜ (x)))
)2
+ γf˜ ′(Φ−1(P˜ (x)))
P˜x(x)
Φ′(Φ−1(P˜ (x)))
]
e
∫ x
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)du
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γK˜
[
γK˜ +
∣∣∣∣∣ P˜x(x)Φ′(Φ−1(P˜ (x)))
∣∣∣∣∣
]
eγK˜|x|
= γK˜
[
γK˜ + c∗ exp
{∫ x
0
γf˜(Φ−1(P˜ (u)))du+
1
2
(
Φ−1(P˜ (x))− x2
)}]
eγK˜|x|
≤ γK˜
[
γK˜ + c∗eγK˜|x|+
1
2((Φ−1(P˜ (x)))2−x2)
]
eγK˜|x|
≤ K¯e2γK˜|x| (2.4.17)
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where the first and second inequalities are due to the boundedness of f˜ and f˜ ′, and
K¯ = (γK˜)2 + γK˜c∗ supx e
1
2((Φ−1(P˜ (x)))2−x2). We have K¯ < ∞ since, due to the Lemma
6 in Appendix, limx→±∞ e
1
2((Φ−1(P˜ (x)))2−x2) ≤ 1 and Φ−1 ◦ P˜ being a continuous function.
The bound (2.4.17) together with the representation (2.4.16) yield, via application of the
Theorem 1.12 in [24], that uxx is a solution to the PDE (2.4.14) with the terminal condition
uxx(1, x).
Next, we show that this λ satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1.
Direct calculation yield that it solves the equation (2.4.8). Indeed,
λt(t, x) =
1
γ
(
utx(t, x)
u(t, x)
− ux(t, x)ut(t, x)
u2(t, x)
)
,
λx(t, x) =
1
γ
(
uxx(t, x)
u(t, x)
− u
2
x(t, x)
u2(t, x)
)
,
λxx(t, x) =
1
γ
(
uxxx(t, x)
u(t, x)
− 3uxx(t, x)ux(t, x)
u2(t, x)
+
2u3x(t, x)
u3(t, x)
)
,
and therefore
I = γ
(
λt(t, x) +
1
2
λxx(t, x) + γλx(t, x)λ(t, x)
)
=
1
u(t, x)
(
ut(t, x) +
uxx(t, x)
2
)
x
− ux(t, x)
u(t, x)2
(
ut(t, x) +
uxx(t, x)
2
)
= 0
Next, we demonstrate that condition 1 of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Indeed, λ is bounded
since
|λ(t, x)| ≤
∫
R Γ(t, x− y) |uy(1, y)| dy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
=
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)
∣∣∣f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)∣∣∣ dy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≤ K˜
γ
due to the boundedness of f˜ .
To show that λ is strictly increasing, we observe that
λx(1, x) =
d
dx
[
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)
]
> 0
due to f˜ , Φ and P˜ being strictly increasing functions. Moreover,
λx(t, x) =
uxx(t, x)u(t, x)− ux(t, x)2
γu(t, x)2
.
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Integration by parts (and using bounds on f˜) will yield
I = uxx(t, x)u(t, x)− ux(t, x)2
=
(∫
R
Γxx(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
)(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
)
−
(∫
R
Γx(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
)2
=
(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uyy(1, y)dy
)(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
)
−
(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy
)2
≥
(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)
√
uyy(1, y)u(1, y)dy
)2
−
(∫
R
Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy
)2
> 0
where the inequality before last is just an application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (uxx > 0
as we will see shortly) and the last inequality holds since
uxx(1, x)u(1, x)− u2x(1, x) = γu2(1, x)λx(1, x) > 0.
Therefore λx(t, x) > 0 for all (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× R, i.e. λ is strictly increasing.
Next, we need to establish that limx→±∞ λx(t, x) = 0. First we show this is true for t = 1.
We have
lim
x→±∞
λx(1, x) = lim
x→±∞
f˜ ′ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) P˜
′(x)
Φ′(Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x))
Observe that since limx→±∞ f˜ ′(x) = 0, we only need to show that
lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)) =
√
2pi lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x)
e−
1
2
(Φ−1◦P˜ (x))2
is finite. Observe that
√
2pi lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x)
e−
1
2
(Φ−1◦P˜ (x))2 =
√
2pi lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′′(x)
e−
1
2
(Φ−1◦P˜ (x))2(−Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)) d
dx
(
Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)
)
=
√
2pi lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x)(γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)− x)
e−
1
2
(Φ−1◦P˜ (x))2(−Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)) P˜ ′(x)
Φ′◦Φ−1◦P˜ (x)
= lim
x→±∞
x− γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)
Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)
= lim
x→±∞
x
Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) = 1 <∞.
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where the one to the last equality is due to the boundedness of f˜ , the last equality is due to
the Lemma 6 in Appendix and the first one is the application of L’Hopital rule. Note that
the rule is applicable since limx→+∞Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) = +∞ and
0 < lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x) =
c∗√
2pi
lim
x→±∞
eγ
∫ x
0 f˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds−x
2
2 ≤ c
∗
√
2pi
lim
x→±∞
eγK˜|x|−
x2
2 = 0.
Therefore
lim
x→±∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x))
is finite. Therefore, the previous considerations yield
lim
x→±∞
λx(1, x) = lim
x→±∞
d
dx
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) = 0. (2.4.18)
Next, we need to show that limx→±∞ λx(t, x) = 0 for any t ∈ [0, 1[. We prove this
statement only for x→ +∞ as the case x→ −∞ is done similarly. First, observe that
uyy(1, y) =
d
dy
(
γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)u(1, y)
)
= γ2
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)2
u(1, y) + γ
d
dy
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)
u(1, y),
and therefore
λx(t, x) =
uxx(t, x)u(t, x)− (ux(t, x))2
γu2(t, x)
=
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)uyy(1, y)dy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
− 1
γ
(∫
R Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
)2
=
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)2
u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
+
∫
R Γ(t, x− y) ddy
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)
u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
−γ
∫R Γ(t, x− y)
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)
u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
2
= γI1(x) + I2(x)− γI23 (x).
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We will show that limx→∞ I1(x) = limx→∞ I23 (x) = d˜
2 and limx→∞ I2(x) = 0, which will yield
the required result. Due to the fact that f˜ is increasing and limx→∞ f˜(x) = d˜ > 0, we have
f˜(x) < d˜ for all x and therefore I1(x) < d˜ and I3(x) < d˜ for all x.
Moreover, fix an  > 0 and let N be such that f˜(N) > d˜− , then we will have
lim
x→+∞
I3(x) = lim
x→+∞
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≥ lim
x→+∞
b˜
∫ N
−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy + (d˜− )
∫∞
N
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= d˜− + lim
x→+∞
(b˜− d˜+ ) ∫ N−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= d˜− ,
where the last equality is due to the Lemma 5 in Appendix. Due to the arbitrariness on ,
and the previous bound on I3 we have limx→∞ I3(x) = d˜ as claimed.
Similarly, (N is the same as before)
lim
x→+∞
I1(x) = lim
x→+∞
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)(f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y))2dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≥ lim
x→+∞
(d˜− )2 ∫∞
N
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= (d˜− )2 − lim
x→+∞
(d˜− )2 ∫ N−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= (d˜− )2,
and therefore limx→∞ I1(x) = d˜ in the same way as before.
Due to (2.4.18) and the fact that d
dy
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)
is continuous, for any  > 0 there
exist constants M and N such that∣∣∣∣ ddy (f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y))
∣∣∣∣ < , ∀y > N
and ∣∣∣∣ ddy (f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y))
∣∣∣∣ < M, ∀y ≤ N
Thus, we will have
lim
x→+∞
|I2(x)| ≤ lim
x→+∞
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)
∣∣∣ ddy (f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y))∣∣∣ dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≤ lim
x→+∞
(M − )
∫ N
−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
+  = ,
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where the last equality is due to the Lemma 5 in Appendix.
We also notice that, since |f˜ | is bounded by K˜, we have for any t ∈ [0, 1]:
|I1(x)| =
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)
∣∣∣f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)∣∣∣2 u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≤ K˜2,
|I3(x)| ≤
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)
∣∣∣f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)∣∣∣u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
≤ K˜,
|I2(x)| =
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)
∣∣∣ ddy (f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y))∣∣∣u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
.
To show λx(t, x) is uniformly bounded for (t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × R, it suffices to show
d
dy
(
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)
)
is uniformly bounded in R, which is true due to 2.4.18.
To conclude that condition 1 of Proposition 1 holds, we need to demonstrate that
limx→∞ λ(t, x) = d˜, and limx→−∞ λ(t, x) = b˜. Notice that by the definition of λ(t, x),
lim
x→∞
λ(t, x) = lim
x→∞
ux(t, x)
γu(t, x)
= lim
x→∞
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)uy(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= lim
x→∞
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
.
Since f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ is bounded by d˜, we have
lim
x→∞
λ(t, x) ≤ lim
x→∞
d˜
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= d˜.
Since f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ is strictly increasing and converge to d˜ when x → +∞. We have for any
 > 0, there exists N > 0 s.t. for any x > N , we have f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) > d˜− . We have,
λ(t, x) =
∫ N
−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
+
∫∞
N
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= I4(x) + I5(x).
Due to boundedness of f˜ and Lemma 5 in Appendix, we have
lim
x→∞
|I4(x)| ≤ K˜ lim
x→∞
∫ N
−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= 0
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and therefore limx→∞ I4(x) = 0. Moreover, due to the same lemma
lim
x→∞
I5(x) ≥ (d˜− )
∫∞
N
Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
= (d˜− )
[
1− lim
x→∞
∫ N
−∞ Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy∫
R Γ(t, x− y)u(1, y)dy
]
= d˜− .
Since  is arbitrarily chosen, we have limx→∞ I5 = d˜. Therefore, limx→∞ λ(t, x) = d˜. Similarly
we can show limx→−∞ λ(t, x) = b˜.
Next we will show the connection between P and P˜ that would imply that the condition
3 of Proposition 1 holds.
Since λ and λx are uniformly bounded due to Lemma 3, Proposition 5.2.9 and Theorem
5.2.5 in [38] yield that for any fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× R there exists unique strong solution to
SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition κt = x. Denote P (t, x) the CDF of κt.
Our goal is to derive P (t, x) via an application of Girsanov theorem. Consider a local
martingale L given by:
Lt = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)dβs − 1
2
∫ t
0
γ2λ2(s, κs)ds
}
.
Since λ(t, x) is bounded, L is a true martingale, and therefore a measure defined by
dP˜
dP
|Ft= Lt
is equivalent to P. Moreover, under P˜ the process κ satisfies
κt = β˜t
by Girsanov Theorem and P[κt < x] = EP˜
[
1κt<x
Lt
]
.
Observe that
1
Lt
= exp
{∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)dβ˜s − 1
2
∫ t
0
γ2λ2(s, κs)ds
}
= exp {I(t, κt)−Nt} ,
where I(t, x) =
∫ x
0
γλ(t, u)du, and
Nt =
∫ t
0
[
It(s, κs) +
1
2
γλx(s, κs) +
1
2
γ2λ2(s, κs)
]
ds.
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Indeed, application of Ito’s formula gives
I(t, κt) =
∫ t
0
It(s, κs)ds+
∫ t
0
Ix(s, κs)dκs +
1
2
∫ t
0
Ixx(s, κs)d〈κ〉s
=
∫ t
0
It(s, κs)ds+
∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)dβ˜s +
∫ t
0
1
2
γλx(s, κs)ds,
which yields the required representation for 1/L.
Moreover,
Nt =
∫ t
0
{
γ
∫ κs
0
λt(s, x)dx+
γ
2
λx(s, κs) +
γ2
2
λ2(s, κs)
}
ds
=
∫ t
0
γ
{∫ κs
0
(
λt(s, x) +
1
2
λxx(s, x) + γλ(s, x)λx(s, x)
)
dx+
1
2
λx(s, 0) +
γ
2
λ2(s, 0)
}
ds
=
γ
2
∫ t
0
{
λx(s, 0) + γλ
2(s, 0)
}
ds = c(t),
where the last equality is due to the fact that λ satisfies (2.4.8) and c is a deterministic
function.
Due to the above considerations, we have
P (t, x) = P[κt < x] = EP˜
[
1κt<xe
I(t,κt)
]
e−c(t)
= e−c(t)
1√
2pit
∫ x
−∞
eI(t,y)e−
y2
2t dy.
The last equality is because κt is a P˜ Brownian motion with normal distribution N(0, t).
Thus we have
Px(1, x) =
e−c(1)√
2pi
exp
{
γ
∫ x
0
λ(1, u)du− x
2
2
}
=
e−c(1)√
2pi
exp
{
γ
∫ x
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du− x
2
2
}
=
e−c(1)
c∗
P˜x(x).
Since P (1, x) is the CDF of κ1, we have
1 =
∫ ∞
−∞
Px(1, x)dx =
e−c(1)
c∗
∫ ∞
−∞
P˜x(x)dx =
e−c(1)
c∗
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due to the definition of P˜ . Therefore we have c∗ = e−c(1) and Px(1, x) = P˜x(x), integrate
both sides we have P (1, x) = P˜ (x) since P (1,∞) = P˜ (∞) = 1.
Finally we will show condition 4 of Proposition 1, i.e., λ(0, 0) = 0. By definition of λ, we
have λ(0, 0) = ux(0,0)
γu(0,0)
. Since
u(0, 0) =
∫
R
1√
2pi
e−
y2
2
+γ
∫ y
0 f˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy =
P˜ (∞)
c∗
=
1
c∗
.
Due to (2.4.15), we also have
ux(0, 0) =
∫
R
Γ(0,−y)uy(1, y)dy =
∫
R
γf˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)√
2pi
exp
{
−y
2
2
+ γ
∫ y
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du
}
dy
Therefore
λ(0, 0) =
c∗√
2pi
∫
R
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y) exp
{
−y
2
2
+ γ
∫ y
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du
}
dy
=
∫
R
P˜y(y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)dy =
∫ 1
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1(u)du
=
∫
R
f˜(z)
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dz = E[f˜(Z)] = 0,
where the second equality is due to the definition of P˜ , the third equality is by change of
variable u = P˜ (y) and fourth equality is by change of variable z = Φ−1(u). 
To collect the results we have so far before moving onto the final Lemma for existence
of equilibrium pricing, we conclude that if given the existence of P˜ solving the integral
equation (2.4.19) defined in Lemma 4 with boundary conditions P˜ (−∞) = 0 and P˜ (∞) =
1, we can define function λ as (2.4.13), a strictly increasing function satisfying (2.4.8).
Moreover, P˜ is the terminal distribution of process κ which is the unique strong solution of
(2.4.10). By Proposition 1, we can define w(t, y) = 1d
dy
λ−1(t,y) ∈ C1,2 : [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R+ with
limy↓b˜w(t, y) = limy↑d˜w(t, y) = 0 for any t ∈ [0, 1] and ξt = λ(t, κt) such that ξ is the unique
strong solution to (2.4.12) and w solves (2.2.4) and (2.4.7). The following Lemma completes
the existence of such pricing rule.
Lemma 4 Consider function f˜ = f − E[f(Z)] where f satisfies Assumption 1 and such
that E[f˜(Z)] = 0. Define limx→∞ f˜(x) = d˜, and limx→−∞ f˜(x) = b˜. Then there exists
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P˜ ∈ C2 : R → R, a function strictly increasing w.r.t. x, with P˜ (−∞) = 0 and P˜ (∞) = 1
satisfying the integral equation
P˜ (x) =
c∗√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γ
∫ u
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− u
2
2
}
du (2.4.19)
where c∗ is chosen such that P˜ (∞) = 1.
Proof. First the integral equation (2.4.19) will make sense because f˜ is bounded,
therefore
∫ u
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds is at most linear. Thus −u2
2
will be the dominating term in
the integral, i.e., ∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
γ
∫ u
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− u
2
2
}
du <∞.
Thus c∗ is well-defined. Denote g(x) = f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) and G(x) = ∫ x
0
g(u)du, we have the
integral expression for P˜ :
P˜ (x) =
c∗√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γG(u)− u
2
2
}
du.
where c∗ is constant to normalise the integral such that:
1 =
c∗√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
γG(u)− u
2
2
}
du.
Here we have a recursive relation to obtain a sequence of gn(x), Gn(x), P˜ n(x) and c∗n such
that
gn(x) = f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ n(x), Gn(x) =
∫ x
0
gn(u)du,
1 =
c∗n√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
γGn(u)− u
2
2
}
du, P˜ n+1(x) =
c∗n√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γGn(u)− u
2
2
}
du.
Denote transformation T , the mapping such that P˜ n+1 = T P˜ n. Define
D =
{
P˜ ∈ Cb(R) : P˜ nondecreasing, P˜ (x) =
∫ x
−∞
P˜x(u)du; P˜ (−∞) = 0; P˜ (∞) = 1;
0 ≤ P˜x(x) ≤ c√
2pi
exp
{
− x
2
2σ2
}}
where we choose any σ2 > 1 and c = 1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
γ2K˜2
2(σ2−1)
}
.
We will show that the set D has the following properties:
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1. D is a convex set: Suppose P˜ 1, P˜ 2 ∈ D and λ ∈ [0, 1], then
P˜ := λP˜ 1 + (1− λ)P˜ 2 ∈ Cb, nondecreasing,
P˜ (−∞) = λP˜ 1(−∞) + (1− λ)P˜ 2(−∞) = 0,
P˜ (∞) = λP˜ 1(∞) + (1− λ)P˜ 2(∞) = 1.
Moreover
P˜ (x) = λP˜ 1(x) + (1− λ)P˜ 2(x)
= λ
∫ x
P˜ 1x (s)ds+ (1− λ)
∫ x
P˜ 2x (s)ds
=
∫ x (
λP˜ 1x (s) + (1− λ)P˜ 2x (s)
)
ds,
0 ≤ P˜x(x) = λP˜ 1x (x) + (1− λ)P˜ 2(x) ≤
c√
2pi
exp
{
− x
2
2σ2
}
.
Thus P˜ ∈ D.
2. D is closed: Since Cb(R) is a Banach space, given {P˜ n}, a sequence of elements in D
converging to some element, P˜ ∈ Cb in the sup norm, i.e., for any  > 0 there exists N
s.t. for any n > N , we have
sup
x∈R
| P˜ n(x)− P˜ (x) |≤ .
Therefore for any y > x,  > 0 and n > N , we have
P˜ (y)− P˜ (x) = P˜ (y)− P˜ n(y) + P˜ n(y)− P˜ n(x) + P˜ n(x)− P˜ (x) ≥ −2
as P˜ n(y)− P˜ n(x) ≥ 0 for each n and y > x. Since  can be arbitrarily small, we have
P˜ is a non-decreasing function.
Moreover, since P˜ n(−∞) = 0 for any n, choose n > N . Then for  > 0 there exists
−L < 0 s.t. for any x < −L we have P˜ n(x) < . Therefore for any x < −L
0 ≤ P˜ (x) = P˜ (x)− P˜ n(x) + P˜ n(x) < 2.
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Thus we have P˜ (−∞) = 0 due to the arbitrary choice of .
Similarly, since P˜ n(∞) = 1 for any n, choose n > N . Then for  > 0 there exists L > 0
s.t. for any x > L we have 1− P˜ n(x) < . Therefore for any x > L
0 ≤ 1− P˜ (x) = 1− P˜ n(x) + P˜ n(x)− P˜ (x) < 2.
Thus we have P˜ (∞) = 1 due to the arbitrary choice of .
In addition, for any x ≤ y in R, it follows from Fatou’s lemma that
0 ≤ P˜ (y)− P˜ (x) = lim
n→∞
∫ y
x
P˜ nx (u)du ≤
∫ y
x
lim sup
n→∞
P˜ nx (u)du.
Since each P˜ nx is bounded from above by the same integrable functions, so will be
lim supn→∞ P˜
n
x (u) for every u ∈ [x, y]. This implies that P˜ is absolutely continuous
and, in particular, there exists a function P˜x with 0 ≤ P˜x(x) ≤ lim supn→∞ P˜ nx (1, x) ≤
c√
2pi
exp{− x2
2σ2
} for all x ∈ R. Hence, D is closed.
3. T P˜ ∈ D. We start from
T P˜ (x) =
c∗
T P˜√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γ
∫ u
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− u
2
2
}
du,
From the definition of T P˜ we know it is increasing function in Cb(R) with T P˜ (−∞) = 0
and c∗
T P˜
is to normalise the integral such that T P˜ (∞) = 1. Moreover, it is absolutely
continuous and can be written as T P˜ (x) =
∫ x
(T P˜ )x(s)ds with
(T P˜ )x =
c∗
T P˜√
2pi
exp
{
γ
∫ x
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− x
2
2
}
.
First we obtain an estimate on c∗
T P˜
. By definition of c∗
T P˜
, we have
c∗
T P˜
=
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp
{
γG(u)− u2
2
}
du
≤
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp
{−γ|G(u)| − u2
2
}
du
≤
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp{−γK˜|u| − u
2
2
}du =
√
2pi
exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞−∞ exp{− (|u|+γK˜)22 }du
=
√
2pi
2 exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞
0
exp{− (u+γK˜)2
2
}du
=
√
2pi
2 exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞
γK˜
exp{−u2
2
}du
=
1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
−γ
2K˜2
2
}
, (2.4.20)
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where G(x) =
∫ x
0
f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds, K˜ is the upper bound of |f˜ | and |f˜ ′|. Therefore,
with σ2 > 1, we have
(T P˜ )x(x)e
x2
2σ2 =
c∗
T P˜√
2pi
exp
{
γG(x)−
(
1
2
− 1
2σ2
)
x2
}
≤ c
∗
T P˜√
2pi
exp
{
γK˜|x| −
(
1
2
− 1
2σ2
)
x2
}
≤ c
∗
T P˜√
2pi
exp
{
γ2K˜2σ2
2(σ2 − 1)
}
≤ 1√
2pi
1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
−γ
2K˜2
2
+
γ2K˜2σ2
2(σ2 − 1)
}
=
1√
2pi
1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
γ2K˜2
2(σ2 − 1)
}
=
c√
2pi
,
where c = 1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
γ2K˜2
2(σ2−1)
}
from definition of D. Thus we have P˜x(x) ≤
c√
2pi
exp{− x2
2σ2
}. Therefore, T P˜ ∈ D.
Concluding from above, we have D is a closed convex subset of Banach space, transformation
T maps from D to D. Thus TD is an equicontinuous family of functions. By Ascoli-Arzela
Theorem (Corollary III.3.3 Lang [39]), if P˜ n is a sequence in TD, then there is a subsequence
which converges not only point-wise to P˜ ∈ Cb(R) but also uniform on every compact interval
of R. We will show the convergence is uniform for any x ∈ R.
Assume P˜ nk is the convergent subsequence. By the definition of D, since P˜ nkx (x) ≤
c√
2pi
exp
{
− x2
2σ2
}
we have:
P˜ nk(x) ≤ c√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
− u
2
2σ2
}
du, 1− P˜ nk(x) ≤ c√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
exp
{
− u
2
2σ2
}
du.
Therefore, there exist x∗ < 0 and x∗ > 0 such that for any  > 0,
P˜ nk(x) ≤ c√
2pi
∫ x∗
−∞
exp
{
− u
2
2σ2
}
du = cσΦσ(x∗) ≤ ,
1− P˜ nk(x) ≤ c√
2pi
∫ ∞
x∗
exp
{
− u
2
2σ2
}
du = cσΦσ(−x∗) ≤ ,
where Φσ is the CDF of N(0, σ).
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Since P˜ nk converges to P˜ point-wise, we also have that for any x ≤ x∗, P˜ (x) ≤  and for
any x ≥ x∗, 1− P˜ (x) ≤ .
We also have the convergence is uniform on the compact [x∗, x∗]. Thus there exist N ∈ N
such that for all k ≥ N
sup
x∈[x∗,x∗]
|P˜ nk(x)− P˜ (x)| ≤ .
Thus for any k ≥ N we have
sup
x∈R
|P˜ nk(x)− P˜ (x)| ≤ sup
x∈[x∗,x∗]
|P˜ nk(x)− P˜ (x)|+ sup
x∈[−∞,x∗]
(P˜ nk(x) + P˜ (x))
+ sup
x∈[x∗,∞]
(1− P˜ nk(x) + 1− P˜ (x)) ≤ 5.
Therefore the convergence of P˜ nk to P˜ is uniform for all x ∈ R. Thus TD is pre-compact in
Cb(R).
Next we show the transformation T is continuous. Assume without loss of generality
P˜ n converge to P˜ ∈ D in sup norm. It suffices to show the point-wise convergence of
T P˜ n to T P˜ (as we have shown above, since T P˜ n ∈ D, if T P˜ n converge to T P˜ point-
wise, we have T P˜ n converge to T P˜ uniformly in R under sup-norm). Since T P˜ n(x) =
c∗n√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ exp{γGn(u)− u
2
2
}du and denote
G(x) =
∫ x
0
g(u)du =
∫ x
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)du.
We already know from (2.4.20) that c∗n has an upper bound
1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
−γ2K˜2
2
}
. Similarly
we can achieve a lower bound for c∗n as well:
c∗n =
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp
{
γG(u)− u2
2
}
du
≥
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp
{
γ|G(u)| − u2
2
}
du
≥
√
2pi∫∞
−∞ exp{γK˜|u| − u
2
2
}du =
√
2pi
exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞−∞ exp{− (|u|−γK˜)22 }du
=
√
2pi
2 exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞
0
exp{− (u−γK˜)2
2
}du
=
√
2pi
2 exp{γ2K˜2
2
} ∫∞−γK˜ exp{−u22 }du
=
1
2Φ(γK˜)
exp
{
−γ
2K˜2
2
}
,
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where K˜ is the upper bound of |f˜ | and |f˜ ′|. Therefore c∗n has a converging subsequence
c∗nk → c∗. To show the point-wise convergence of T P˜ n to T P˜ , it suffices to show point-wise
convergence of T P˜ nk to T P˜ .
To do so, it suffices to show point-wise convergence of c∗nk exp{γGnk} to c∗ exp{γG} by
Scheffe’s theorem (Theorem 3.16.12 by Billingsley [6]). We have
lim
k→∞
∣∣c∗nk exp{γGnk(x)} − c∗ exp{γG(x)}∣∣
≤ lim
k→∞
∣∣c∗nk exp{γGnk(x)} − c∗nk exp{γG(x)}∣∣+ limk→∞ ∣∣c∗nk exp{γG(x)} − c∗ exp{γG(x)}∣∣
= I1 + I2.
To investigate the first term, we notice
I1 = lim
k→∞
c∗nk exp{γG(x)}
∣∣∣∣exp{γ ∫ x
0
(f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ nk − f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ )(u)du
}
− 1
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
k→∞
c∗nk exp{γK˜|x|}
∣∣∣∣∣exp
{
γ|x| sup
[0,x]
∣∣∣f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ nk(u)− f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)∣∣∣}− 1∣∣∣∣∣ .
Since P˜ nk converges to P˜ uniformly, we have for any  > 0, there exists N ∈ N s.t. for any
k > N , we have
sup
x∈R
|P˜ nk(x)− P˜ (x)| < .
Therefore for any x ∈ R, when k > N , P˜ (x) −  < P˜ nk(x) < P˜ (x) + . Thus, we have for
any 0 <  < 1
2
(P˜ (x)− P˜ (0)),
J = sup
[0,x]
∣∣∣f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ nk(u)− f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (u)∣∣∣
≤
√
2pi sup
[P˜ (0)−,P˜ (x)+]
f˜ ′(Φ−1(y)) exp
{
(Φ−1(y))2
2
}
sup
[0,x]
|P˜ nk(u)− P˜ (u)|
<
√
2piK˜ sup
[P˜ (0)−,P˜ (x)+]
exp
{
(Φ−1(y))2
2
}
=
√
2piK˜M(x, )
where M(x, ) is an increasing function of . Moreover,
lim
↓0
M(x, ) = sup
[P˜ (0),P˜ (x)]
exp
{
(Φ−1(y))2
2
}
= M(x).
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Therefore we have
I1 < lim
k→∞
c∗nk exp{γK˜|x|}
∣∣∣exp{√2piγ|x|K˜M(x, )}− 1∣∣∣
≤ c∗ exp{γK˜|x|} lim
↓0
∣∣∣exp{√2piγ|x|K˜M(x, )}− 1∣∣∣
=
1
2Φ(−γK˜) exp
{
−γ
2K˜2
2
+ γK˜|x|
}
lim
↓0
∣∣∣exp{√2piγ|x|K˜M(x)}− 1∣∣∣ = 0.
Note in the above inequality, the choice of k and  are independent.
Since c∗nk → c∗, there exists N˜ ∈ N such that for any > 0 and k > N˜ we have
|c∗nk − c∗| ≤ .
Thus
I2 = lim
k→∞
|c∗nk − c∗| exp{γG(x)}
≤ exp{γK˜|x|} lim
k→∞
|c∗nk − c∗| = 0.
Therefore
lim
k→∞
∣∣c∗nk exp{γGn(x)} − c∗ exp{γG(x)}∣∣ = I1 + I2 = 0.
Hence T P˜ n converges to T P˜ point-wise. This implies that T P˜ n converge to T P˜ uniformly
in R under sup-norm. As P˜ n converge to P˜ uniformly in R under sup-norm, we have T is
a continuous operator. D is a closed and convex subset of a Banach space and TD is pre-
compact. Therefore, by Schauder’s fixed point theorem(Theorem 7.1.2 by Friedman [24]), T
has a fixed point P , i.e. T P˜ = P˜ . Moreover P˜ ∈ C1 due to the definition of operator T P˜ ,
P˜ is differentiable with continuous derivatives. We know P˜ ∈ C2 since directly differentiate
(2.4.19) we have P˜xx = P˜x
(
γf ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)− x
)
.
In addition, P˜ is strictly increasing as the derivative is strictly positive. 
Now we have the existence of P˜ solving the integral equation, as discussed before the
Lemma, we have the equilibrium pricing rule w(t, ξ) where w is defined in Proposition 1.
Moreover, we will show in the following Corollary that ρ, the transition density of process
ξ, and p, the transition density of process κ, exist and can be derived one another through
the connection between w and λ.
43
Corollary 2 Let P˜ be the cumulative distribution function given by Lemma 4 and λ given
by
λ(t, x) :=
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Then the unique strong solution of SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition κ0 = 0 a.s., κ, admits
a transition density, denoted by p. Moreover, this transition density will satisfy Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation
p(t, y; s, z) =
∫
R
p(t, y;u, x)p(u, x; s, z)dx,
and have the following smoothness properties:
1. (continuity in the forward space variable) p(s, x; t, .) : R → [0,∞[ is continuous for
s ∈ [0, t[ and x ∈ R;
2. (smoothness in backward variables) (s, x) → p(s, x; t, y) belongs to C1,2([0, t[×R) for
every y ∈ R.
Furthermore, κ is a Feller process.
Moreover, consider the weighting function w(t, x) = 1
λ−1x (t,x)
and ξ, the unique strong
solution of SDE (2.4.12) with initial condition ξ0 = 0 a.s..Then ξ admits a transition density,
denoted by ρ which is given by
ρ(t, y; s, z) =
p(t, λ−1(t, y); s, λ−1(s, z))
w(s, z)
.
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of a strong solution of SDE (2.4.10) with initial
condition κ0 = 0 a.s., was established in Lemma 3. Moreover, since λ and λx are uniformly
bounded due to Lemma 3, Proposition 5.2.9 and Theorem 5.2.5 in [38] yield that for any fixed
(t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × R there exists unique strong solution to SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition
κt = x.
Existence, uniqueness, and smoothness in backward variables (s, x) of the transition
density function p follows from pp. 368-369 of [38]. Indeed, those considerations apply due
to the uniform (on [0, 1]×R) boundedness of λ and λx and the fact that there exists unique
strong solution to (2.4.10) with initial condition κt = x for any (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× R.
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In particular, there exists a unique fundamental solution of
vt(t, x) +
1
2
vxx(t, x) + γλ(t, x)vx(t, x) = 0, (2.4.21)
which is the transition density p.
To show that p satisfies Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, fix any (s, z) ∈ [0, 1] × R and
0 ≤ u < s. Observe that p(t, y; s, z) satisfies (2.4.21) on [0, u] × R with terminal condition
v(u, x) = p(u, x; s, z). Then, due to Theorem 5.7.6 in [38], we have the required representa-
tion
p(t, y; s, z) =
∫
R
p(t, y;u, x)p(u, x; s, z)dx.
The above considerations, together with the definition of the fundamental solution and the
Theorem 11 in Chapter 1, Section 6 in [24] implies that κ is a Feller process.
The continuity in the forward space variable follows from Theorem 3.2.1 in [53] and the
fact that p is the unique fundamental solution of (2.4.21).
Finally, we turn to the transition density of ξ. Due to the Proposition 1, ξt = λ(t, κt).
Moreover, considerations similar to the ones in the Proposition 1 yield that for any fixed
(t, y) ∈ [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[, we have ξ(t,y)s = λ(s, κ(t,λ−1(t,y))s ) for all s ∈ [t, 1], where ξ(t,y) is the
unique strong solution of SDE (2.4.12) with initial condition ξ
(t,y)
t = y and κ
(t,λ−1(t,y)) is the
unique strong solution of SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition κ
(t,λ−1(t,y))
t = λ
−1(t, y). The
proof is similar to the consideration in Proposition 1. We have shown in the first paragraph
that SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition κt = x where (t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × R has unique strong
solution. Since y ∈]b˜, d˜[, we have λ−1(t, y) ∈ R. Denote κ as the unique strong solution to
SDE (2.4.10) with initial condition κt = λ
−1(t, y). Define ξs = λ(s, κs), which is consistent
with the initial condition
ξt = λ(t, κt) = λ(t, λ
−1(t, y)) = y.
Application of Ito’s formula will yield
ξs = ξt+
∫ s
t
λx(u, κu)dκu +
∫ s
t
(
λu(u, κu) +
λxx(u, κu)
2
)
du
= y+
∫ s
t
λx(u, κu) (dβu + γλ(u, κu)du)− γ
∫ s
t
λ(u, κu)λx(u, κu)du
= y+
∫ s
t
λx(u, κu)dβu =
∫ s
t
λx(u, λ
−1(u, ξu))dβu =
∫ s
t
w(u, ξu)dβu.
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Therefore ξs = λ(s, κs) is a strong solution to SDE (2.4.12) with initial condition ξt = y for
(t, y) ∈ [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[. Denote that τ = inf{s > t : ξs /∈]b˜, d˜[} = inf{s > t : κs /∈] −∞,+∞[}.
Since κ is non-explosive due to the boundedness of the drift term γλ(s, κs), we have τ > 1.
To show the uniqueness of the solution to the SDE (2.4.12), suppose there is another
strong solution ξ˜. Denote a sequence of open sets Vn =]b˜ +
1
n
, d˜ − 1
n
[, n = 1, 2, ... and
define a sequence of stopping times νn by νn = inf{s ≥ t : ξ˜s /∈ Vn}. Then the process
κ˜s := λ
−1(s, ξ˜s) is well defined on [t, νn] for all n. Note that since λ is increasing function,
νn = inf{s ≥ t : κ˜s /∈ Un}, where Un =
]
λ−1(s, b˜+ 1
n
), λ−1(s, d˜− 1
n
)
[
.
Application of Ito’s formula to κ˜ stopped at νn will yield
κ˜s∧νn = λ
−1(t, y)+
∫ s∧νn
t
λ−1x (u, ξ˜u)dξ˜u +
∫ s∧νn
t
(
λ−1u (u, ξ˜u) +
λ−1xx (u, ξ˜u)w
2(u, ξ˜u)
2
)
du
= λ−1(t, y)+
∫ s∧νn
t
λ−1x (u, ξ˜u)w(u, ξ˜u)dβu +
∫ s∧νn
t
λ−1u (u, ξ˜u) + λ−1xx (u, ξ˜u)
2
(
λ−1x (u, ξ˜u)
)2
 du
= λ−1(t, y)+
∫ s∧νn
t
λ−1x (u, ξ˜u)w(u, ξ˜u)dβu +
∫ s∧νn
t
γξ˜udu
= λ−1(t, y)+
∫ s∧νn
t
dβu +
∫ s∧νn
t
γλ(u, κ˜u)du,
and therefore κ˜ is a strong solution of (2.4.10) in [t, s∧ νn] for each n ∈ N. Since solution to
(2.4.10) with initial condition κt = λ
−1(t, y) is unique, we have κ˜s∧νn = κs∧νn for all s ∈ [t, 1].
Taking the limit, in view of continuity of κ, we have κ˜s∧ν = κs∧ν for all s ∈ [t, 1], where
ν = limn→∞ νn. In particular, κ˜1∧ν = κ1∧ν and therefore ν < 1 is equivalent to τ < 1 which
has probability zero due to the arguments similar to Remark 4. Thus,
κ˜s = κ˜s∧ν = κs∧ν = κs t ∈ [t, 1].
Due to the connection between κ˜ and ξ˜ and continuity of κ˜ as well as κ, the above implies
that
P[ξ˜s = ξs, s ∈ [0, 1]] = 1.
Therefore ξ
(t,y)
s = λ(s, κ
(t,λ−1(t,y))
s ) for all s ∈ [t, 1] is the unique strong solution of SDE
(2.4.12) with initial condition ξ
(t,y)
t = y.
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Let φ be any bounded continuous function on R. For any (t, y) ∈ [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[ and s ∈ [t, 1]
we have:
E[φ(s, ξ(t,y)s )] = E[φ(s, λ(s, κ(t,λ
−1(t,y))
s ))] =
∫
R
φ(s, λ(s, z))p(t, λ−1(t, y); s, z)dz
=
∫ d˜
b˜
φ(s, u)p(t, λ−1(t, y); s, λ−1(s, u))dλ−1(s, u)
=
∫ d˜
b˜
φ(s, u)
p(t, λ−1(t, y); s, λ−1(s, u))
w(s, u)
du
=
∫ d˜
b˜
φ(s, u)ρ(t, y; s, u)du
which implies that the density of ξ exists and is as stated. The second equality is by applying
the transition density of κ, the third equality is by change of variable u = λ(s, z), the fourth
equality is by connection between w and λ. 
In the next Subsection, we complete by giving the optimal trading strategy of the insider
under equilibrium described by the transition density ρ(t, ξ).
2.5 Equilibrium
In this Subsection, we give an inconspicuous equilibrium consists of the rational pricing rule
(P ∗, w∗) and optimal trading strategy θ∗ for the insider.
Theorem 3 Under Assumption 1, a triplet (P ∗, w∗, θ∗) given by the following is an incon-
spicuous equilibrium.
1. The weighting function w∗(t, x) = 1
λ−1x (t,x)
where λ is given by
λ(t, x) :=
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)f˜ ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
γ
∫
R Γ(t, x− y)e
∫ y
0 γf˜◦Φ−1◦P˜ (u)dudy
, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
The existence of P˜ is given by Lemma 4.
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2. The insider’s trading strategy θ∗t =
∫ t
0
α∗(s, ξ∗s )ds where
α∗(t, x) = w∗(t, x)
ρx(t, x; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, x; 1, f˜(Z))
.
ρ is defined in Corollary 2 as the transition density of process ξ where ξ satisfies the
SDE ξt =
∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξs)dβs.
3. The market maker’s pricing function P ∗t = ξ
∗
t + E[f(Z)], where ξ∗ satisfies the SDE
ξ∗t =
∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξ∗s )dY
∗
s .
The cumulative order Y ∗t = Bt + θ
∗
t .
Proof. We will first show that (P ∗, w∗) is admissible in the sense of Definition 1.
We know by Proposition 1, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have the weighting function w∗ is
well-defined, positive in the interior of its domain and satisfies the PDE
w∗t (t, x)
w∗(t, x)2
+
w∗xx(t, x)
2
= −γ.
In addition, there exists unique strong solution ξ to the SDE
ξt =
∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξs)dβs.
By Proposition 1, it can be written as ξt = λ(t, κt) where κ is the unique strong solution of
SDE (2.4.10), i.e.,
κt = βt +
∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)ds.
From Remark 4, we have τ > 1 a.s. Thus w∗ is admissible pricing rule.
Next we show θ∗ is admissible, i.e., θ∗ ∈ A(w∗). By construction θ∗ is absolutely contin-
uous. We need to show there exists unique strong solution for the SDE
dξ∗t = w
∗(t, ξ∗t )dBt + w
∗(t, ξ∗t )
2ρξ(t, ξ
∗
t ; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, ξ∗t ; 1, f˜(Z))
dt, (2.5.22)
with initial condition ξ∗0 = 0 a.s.. We will show under the connection ξ
∗
t = λ(t, κ
∗
t ), it is
equivalent to show there exists unique strong solution for the SDE
dκ∗t = dBt + γλ(t, κ
∗
t )dt+
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
p(t, κ∗t ; 1, λ−1(1, f˜(Z)))
dt, (2.5.23)
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with initial condition κ∗0 = 0 a.s.. This is consistent with our result from Lemma 3 that
λ(0, 0) = 0. To show that ξ∗t = λ(t, κ
∗
t ) is a strong solution, apply Ito’s formula, we have
dξ∗t =
(
λt(t, κ
∗
t ) +
1
2
λxx(t, κ
∗
t )
)
dt+ λx(t, κ
∗
t )dκ
∗
t
= −γλ(t, κ∗t )λx(t, κ∗t )dt+ λx(t, κ∗t )dBt + γλ(t, κ∗t )λx(t, κ∗t )dt
+λx(t, κ
∗
t )
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
p(t, κ∗t ; 1, λ−1(1, f˜(Z)))
dt
= w∗(t, ξ∗t )dBt + w
∗(t, ξ∗t )
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
p(t, κ∗t ; 1, λ−1(1, f˜(Z)))
dt
where the second equality is due to Burger’s equation (2.4.8) and the third equality is due
to the equality
λx(t, x) =
1
λ−1y (t, λ(t, x))
= w∗(t, λ(t, x)).
Due to Corollary 2, we have the connection between ρ and p given as follows
p(t, κ∗t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z))) = w∗(1, f˜(Z))ρ(t, ξ∗t ; 1, f˜(Z)).
Therefore differentiate w.r.t. the first space variable, we have
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z))) = w∗(1, f˜(Z))w∗(t, ξ∗t )ρx(t, ξ
∗
t ; 1, f˜(Z)).
Substitute into the Ito’s formula we have
dξ∗t = w
∗(t, ξ∗t )dBt + w
∗(t, ξ∗t )
2ρx(t, ξ
∗
t ; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, ξ∗t ; 1, f˜(Z))
dt.
Therefore, ξ∗t = λ(t, κ
∗
t ) is a strong solution to SDE (2.5.22). It remains to show the unique-
ness of the solution of the SDE (2.5.22). Suppose there is another strong solution ξ˜. Denote
a sequence of open sets Vn =]b˜ +
1
n
, d˜ − 1
n
[, n = 1, 2, ... and define a sequence of stopping
times νn by νn = inf{t ≥ 0 : ξ˜t /∈ Vn}. Then the process κ˜t := λ−1(t, ξ˜t) is well defined on
[0, νn] for all n. Note that since λ is increasing function, νn = inf{t ≥ 0 : κ˜t /∈ Un}, where
Un =
]
λ−1(t, b˜+ 1
n
), λ−1(t, d˜− 1
n
)
[
.
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Application of Ito’s formula to κ˜ stopped at νn will yield
κ˜t∧νn =
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)dξ˜s +
∫ t∧νn
0
(
λ−1s (s, ξ˜s) +
λ−1xx (s, ξ˜s)w
2(t, ξ˜s)
2
)
ds
=
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)
(
w∗(t, ξ˜t)dBt + w∗(t, ξ˜t)2
ρx(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z))
dt
)
+
∫ t∧νn
0
γξ˜sds
=
∫ t∧νn
0
dBs +
∫ t∧νn
0
γλ(s, κ˜s)ds+
∫ t∧νn
0
w∗(t, ξ˜t)
ρx(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z))
dt
where the second equality is due to a derivation of Burger’s equation (2.6.25), the third
equation is due to the equality
λ−1y (t, y) =
1
w∗(t, y)
.
Similar as before, due to Corollary 2, we have the connection between ρ and p given as
follows
ρ(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z)) =
p(t, κ˜t; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
w∗(1, f˜(Z))
.
Therefore differentiate w.r.t. the first space variable, we have
ρx(t, ξ˜t; 1, f˜(Z)) =
px(t, κ˜t; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
w∗(1, f˜(Z))w∗(t, ξ˜t)
.
Substitute into the Ito’s formula we have
κ˜t∧νn =
∫ t∧νn
0
dBs +
∫ t∧νn
0
γλ(s, κ˜s)ds+
∫ t∧νn
0
px(t, κ˜t; 1, λ(1, f˜(Z)))
p(t, κ˜t; 1, λ(1, f˜(Z)))
dt.
Therefore κ˜ is a strong solution of (2.5.23). Since solution to (2.5.23) is unique, we
have κ˜t∧νn = κ
∗
t∧νn for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the limit, in view of continuity of κ∗, we have
κ˜t∧ν = κ∗t∧ν for all t ∈ [0, 1], where ν = limn→∞ νn. In particular, κ˜1∧ν = κ∗1∧ν and therefore
ν < 1 is equivalent to τ < 1 which has probability zero due to the arguments above. Thus,
κ˜t = κ˜t∧ν = κ∗t∧ν = κ
∗
t t ∈ [0, 1].
We apply Theorem 2.4 by Cetin and Danilova [13] to show that unique strong solution
exists for (2.5.23). Denote E = R and [0, 1] × E be the set containing the range of the
process (t, κ∗t ). Conditions to apply the theorem need to be checked are as follows:
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1. Assumption 2.1 [13] in one dimensional case where a = 1 and b = γλ(t, x) is uniformly
bounded by ]b˜, d˜[. The local martingale problem for A is well-posed whereas A is
defined as
At =
1
2
∂2
∂x2
+ γλ(t, x)
∂
∂x
.
To see that, by Corollary 5.4.8 and 5.4.9 of Karatzas and Shreve [38], the well-posedness
of martingale problem is equivalently the existence of weak solution and uniqueness in
law of the solution of the induced SDE by the martingale problem. Due to Theorem
5.2.9 [38], since the drift term is global Lipschitz and bounded by Lemma 3, we have
the SDE (2.4.10) admits unique strong solution for any initial condition κ0 = κ a.s..
Therefore the well-posedness of martingale problem is satisfied.
2. Assumption 2.2 [13]: we know κ as the unique strong solution of SDE (2.4.10) is a
Feller process. Moreover, since p satisfies Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, κ admits
the semigroup property.
We have shown in Corollary 2 that p has desired smoothness properties which is con-
dition (H) in Assumption 2.2 [13].
3. We have shown in Lemma 3 that λx is uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists constant
M s.t. for all t ∈ [0, 1], x, y ∈ R,
|λ(t, x)− λ(t, y)| ≤M |x− y|.
4. We want to show p(t, y; 1, y′) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1[, y, y′ ∈ R. p is the fundamental solu-
tion of the parabolic partial differential equation (2.4.21) with coefficient λ uniformly
bounded, hence at most linear growth. We have by Theorem 1.1 [45] that the funda-
mental solution has a Gaussian lower bound with coefficients depending on uniform
boundedness of growth condition on γλ. Therefore p(t, y; 1, y′) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1[,
y, y′ ∈ R.
5. We also need to show P s,x(inf{t > s : κt /∈ R} < 1) = 0 for any (t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × R
where κ satisfies SDE (2.4.10). It suffices to show that the escape time of process κ is
51
a.s. ∞, i.e., the process κ is non-explosive, which it is as the unique strong solution of
the bounded drift one dimensional Levy process (2.4.10).
With all of the above conditions being satisfied, we have the SDE (2.5.23) has a unique
strong solution. Moreover, κ∗1 = λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)). Therefore we have unique strong solution ξ∗
for SDE (2.5.22) and ξ∗1 = f˜(Z) a.s. which satisfies the second condition of the equilibrium
Lemma 2.
Next we need to show (P ∗, w∗, θ∗) given satisfy the remaining two conditions of the
equilibrium Lemma 2.
From above construction of ξ∗ which is the unique strong solution of SDE ξt =∫ t
0
w∗(s, ξs)dY ∗s with terminal distribution ξ1 = f˜(Z), we have constructed a Markov bridge
adapted to its own filtration. Moreover, we have
E
[
α∗(t, ξ∗t )|Fξ
∗
t
]
= E
[
w∗(t, ξ∗t )
ρx(t, ξ
∗
t ; 1, f˜(Z))
ρ(t, ξ∗t ; 1, f˜(Z))
|Fξ∗t
]
= E
[
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, λ
−1(1, f˜(Z)))
p(t, κ∗t ; 1, λ−1(1, f˜(Z)))
|Fκ∗t
]
=
∫
R
px(t, κ
∗
t ; 1, u)du
where the last equality is because p can be also viewed as the conditional density of
λ−1(1, f˜(Z)). Since
∫
R p(t, x; 1, u)du = 1 as p is transition density of κ
∗. Moreover, from
Theorem 11 of Chapter I [24], we have estimate
|px(t, x; 1, u)| ≤ C(c)
1− t exp
[
−c(u− x)
2
2(1− t)
]
for some C as function of c and any c < 1. Thus for any bounded x, we have |px| ≤
C˜ exp(−c˜u2) where C˜ and c˜ depend on (t, u). Then by Leibniz rule, we can exchange the
order of integration and differentiation and obtain∫
R
px(t, x; 1, u)du = 0 = E
[
α∗(t, ξ∗t )|Fξ
∗
t
]
.
Therefore we have Y ∗t = Bt +
∫ t
0
α∗(s, ξ∗t )ds is an F
ξ∗
t -local martingale. Moreover, since
[Y ∗]t = [B]t = t, by Levy’s characterisation, we know Y ∗ is a standard Brownian motion in
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its own filtration. To show P ∗ is a FY
∗
martingale, it suffices to show ξ∗ is a FY
∗
martingale.
We know ξ∗t =
∫ t
0
w(s, ξ∗s )dY
∗
s is a local martingale in its own filtration due to continuity of
w∗. Moreover, w∗ is bounded due to Proposition 1. Thus ξ∗ is a true martingale.
Finally we show P ∗ is rational, equivalently we want to show P ∗t = ξ
∗
t + E[f(Z)] =
E[f(Z)|FY ∗t ]. Since ξ∗ is a martingale, we have ξ∗t = E[f˜(Z)|Fξ
∗
t ] = E[f˜(Z)|FY ∗t ]. Therefore
we have
P ∗t = ξ
∗
t + E[f(Z)] = E[f˜(Z)|FY
∗
t ] + E[f(Z)] = E[f(Z)|FY
∗
t ].
Thus P ∗ is rational.

The importance of the above equilibrium is as follows. Cho [12] considered exponential
utility with weighting function w depending only on time variable. He concluded that there
was no equilibrium unless the asset value is normally distributed. Now we see by relaxing
the condition on weighting function to depend on the path of cumulative order as well, linear
equilibrium exists under general, non-Gaussian framework. In comparison with risk-neutral
insider case, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
Future research could be made in the following directions. One straightforward extension
of the result is to consider unbounded, at most linear valuation function f . During our
attempt the difficulty lies in proving the integral equation (2.4.19) has a smooth solution.
Another new angle is to consider the dynamic information case where the insider observes
the information over time, instead of observing the full information at time 0. On the other
hand, the model for noise traders can be generalised to fit reality of the market, e.g., to have
time-varying volatility or to be modelled as Poisson process. We could also consider the case
where market makers are made risk-averse.
2.6 Appendix: proof of results in Section 2.4.1
Proof of Proposition 1. We start the proof by showing w is well-defined. Suppose there
exist λ solving (2.4.8) and (2.4.9). Since λ is strictly increasing w.r.t. x, λ−1(t, y) exists,
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well-defined and strictly increasing for any y ∈]b˜, d˜[. As λ(t, x) ∈ C1,3, we have
d
dy
λ−1(t, y) =
1
λx(t, λ−1(t, y))
. (2.6.24)
d2
dy2
λ−1(t, y) =
−λxx(t, λ−1(t, y))
λ2x(t, λ
−1(t, y))
d
dy
λ−1(t, y) =
−λxx(t, λ−1(t, y))
λ3x(t, λ
−1(t, y))
.
d3
dy3
λ−1(t, y) =
−λxxx(t, λ−1(t, y))
λ4x(t, λ
−1(t, y))
+
3λ2xx(t, λ
−1(t, y))
λ5x(t, λ
−1(t, y))
.
We also have
λ−1t (t, y) = −
λt(t, λ
−1(t, y))
λx(t, λ−1(t, y))
.
Therefore λ−1(t, y) ∈ C1,3([0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[) → R. In particular, since λ(t, x) is strictly in-
creasing, differentiable and bounded, we have λx(t, x) > 0 for any (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[. Thus
by (2.6.24), we have ∂λ
−1
∂y
(t, y) > 0 and w(t, y) = 1
λ−1y (t,y)
∈ C1,2([0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[→ R) is well de-
fined. To see the behaviour of w on the boundaries b˜ and d˜, we notice limx→±∞ λx(t, x) = 0.
Therefore by (2.6.24), we have
lim
y↓b˜
w(t, y) = lim
y↓b˜
1
λ−1y (t, y)
= lim
y↓b˜
λx(t, λ
−1(t, y)).
Since we have limx→−∞ λ(t, x) = b˜ and λ(t, x) is strictly increasing function w.r.t. x, we have
lim
y↓b˜
w(t, y) = lim
x→−∞
λx(t, x) = 0.
Similarly we have
lim
y↑d˜
w(t, y) = lim
y↑d˜
1
λ−1y (t, y)
= lim
y↑d˜
λx(t, λ
−1(t, y)).
Since we have limx→∞ λ(t, x) = d˜ and λ(t, x) is strictly increasing function w.r.t. x, we have
lim
y↑d˜
w(t, y) = lim
x→∞
λx(t, x) = 0.
Moreover, since λx(t, x) is strictly positive for any x ∈ R, thus λ−1y (t, y) is strictly positive
for any y ∈]b˜, d˜[. Therefore w(t, y) is strictly positive for any (t, y) ∈ [0, 1]×]b˜, d˜[.
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To derive PDE of w, we first derive PDE of λ−1 from (2.4.8). For simplicity in the rest
of the proof, unless specified, λ and its derivatives will be function of (t, λ−1(t, y)). Since
λ(t, λ−1(t, y)) = y, we differentiate w.r.t. t and y
λt + λxλ
−1
t = 0, λxλ
−1
y = 1, λxx(λ
−1
y )
2 + λxλ
−1
yy = 0.
Thus we have the following
λ−1t = −
λt
λx
, λ−1y =
1
λx
, λ−1yy = −
λxx
λ3x
.
Therefore
λ−1t +
λ−1yy
2(λ−1y )2
= − 1
λx
(
λt +
1
2
λxx
)
= γλ(t, λ−1(t, y)) = γy. (2.6.25)
Note w(t, y) = 1
λ−1y (t,y)
, thus wt(t,y)
w2(t,y)
= −λ−1ty (t, y) and wy(t, y) = − λ
−1
yy (t,y)
(λ−1y (t,y))2
. Therefore
wt(t, y)
w2(t, y)
+
wyy(t, y)
2
= −
(
λ−1t +
λ−1yy
2(λ−1y )2
)
y
= −γ.
Thus w(t, y) = 1
λ−1y (t,y)
satisfies (2.2.4).
Define ξt = λ(t, κt), which is consistent with the initial condition
0 = ξ0 = λ(0, κ0) = λ(0, 0).
Since λ is strictly increasing w.r.t. space variable, λ−1 exists and is well defined. Application
of Ito’s formula will yield
ξt = ξ0+
∫ t
0
λx(s, κs)dκs +
∫ t
0
(
λs(s, κs) +
λxx(s, κs)
2
)
ds
=
∫ t
0
λx(s, κs) (dβs + γλ(s, κs)ds)− γ
∫ t
0
λ(s, κs)λx(s, κs)ds
=
∫ t
0
λx(s, κs)dβs =
∫ t
0
λx(s, λ
−1(s, ξs))dβs =
∫ t
0
w(s, ξs)dβs.
Therefore ξt = λ(t, κt) is a strong solution to SDE (2.4.12). Observe that inf{t > 0 : ξt /∈
]b˜, d˜[} = inf{t > 0 : κt /∈] −∞,+∞[}. Since κ is non-explosive due to the boundedness of
the drift term γλ(t, κt), we have τ > 1. Equivalently,
P(κt >∞) = P(βt +
∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)ds >∞)
≤ P(βt −max{−b˜, d˜}t >∞) = P(βt >∞) = 0
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together with
P(κt < −∞) = P(βt +
∫ t
0
γλ(s, κs)ds < −∞)
≤ P(βt + max{−b˜, d˜}t < −∞) = P(βt < −∞) = 0
yield the non-explosiveness of κ. Therefore τ > 1.
To conclude that statement 2 of the Proposition hold, it remains to show the uniqueness
of the solution of the SDE
dξt = w(t, ξt)dβt.
Suppose there is another strong solution ξ˜. Denote a sequence of open sets Vn =]b˜+
1
n
, d˜− 1
n
[,
n = 1, 2, ... and define a sequence of stopping times νn by νn = inf{t ≥ 0 : ξ˜t /∈ Vn}. Then
the process κ˜t := λ
−1(t, ξ˜t) is well defined on [0, νn] for all n. Note that since λ is increasing
function, νn = inf{t ≥ 0 : κ˜t /∈ Un}, where Un =
]
λ−1(t, b˜+ 1
n
), λ−1(t, d˜− 1
n
)
[
.
Application of Ito’s formula to κ˜ stopped at νn will yield
κ˜t∧νn =
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)dξ˜s +
∫ t∧νn
0
(
λ−1s (s, ξ˜s) +
λ−1xx (s, ξ˜s)w
2(s, ξ˜s)
2
)
ds
=
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)w(s, ξ˜s)dβs +
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1s (s, ξ˜s) + λ−1xx (s, ξ˜s)
2
(
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)
)2
 ds
=
∫ t∧νn
0
λ−1x (s, ξ˜s)w(s, ξ˜s)dβs +
∫ t∧νn
0
γξ˜sds
=
∫ t∧νn
0
dβs +
∫ t∧νn
0
γλ(s, κ˜s)ds,
and therefore κ˜ is a strong solution of (2.4.10) in [0, t ∧ νn] for each n ∈ N. Since solution
to (2.4.10) is unique, we have κ˜t∧νn = κt∧νn for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the limit, in view of
continuity of κ, we have κ˜t∧ν = κt∧ν for all t ∈ [0, 1], where ν = limn→∞ νn. In particular,
κ˜1∧ν = κ1∧ν and therefore ν < 1 is equivalent to τ < 1 which has probability zero due to the
arguments in Remark 4. Thus,
κ˜t = κ˜t∧ν = κt∧ν = κt t ∈ [0, 1].
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Due to the connection between κ˜ and ξ˜ and continuity of κ˜ as well as κ, the above implies
that
P[ξ˜t = ξt, t ∈ [0, 1]] = 1.
Finally, the distributional equality of the condition 3 of the Proposition holds since (2.4.9)
is equivalent to λ(1, κ1)
d
= f˜(Z) where Z = N(0, 1) since P (1, x) is the cumulative distribution
function of κ1. Therefore
ξ1 = λ(1, κ1)
d
= f˜(Z).

Lemma 5 Consider a function g satisfying
0 < g(x) ≤ eM |x|, ∀x ∈ R
for some constant M . Then for any z ∈ R and t ∈ [0, 1[ we have
lim
x→+∞
∫ z
−∞
Γ(t, x− y)g(y)dy = 0,
where Γ(t, x) = 1√
2pi(1−t) exp
{
− x2
2(1−t)
}
.
Proof. As
∫ z
−∞ Γ(t, x − y)g(y)dy is increasing in z, we can assume, without loss of
generality, that z > 0.
We have
0 <
∫ z
−∞
Γ(t, x− y)g(y)dy
<
∫ z
0
1√
2pi(1− t)e
− (x−y)2
2(1−t) +Mydy +
∫ 0
−∞
1√
2pi(1− t)e
− (x−y)2
2(1−t) −Mydy
= I1(x) + I2(x).
To complete the squares for each integral, we have
I1(x) =
∫ z
0
1√
2pi(1− t)e
− 1
2(1−t) [x−y+(1−t)M ]2+
(1−t)M2
2
+Mxdy
= e
(1−t)M2
2
+Mx
∫ z−x−(1−t)M
−x−(1−t)M
1√
2pi(1− t)e
− u2
2(1−t)du
= e
(1−t)M2
2
+Mx
[
Φ
(
z − x− (1− t)M√
1− t
)
− Φ
(−x− (1− t)M√
1− t
)]
.
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Similarly, we have
I2(x) = e
(1−t)M2
2
−MxΦ
(−x+ (1− t)M√
1− t
)
.
Take limits when x→ +∞, we have limx→∞ I2(x) = 0 and
lim
x→∞
I1(x) = lim
x→∞
Φ
(
z−x−(1−t)M√
1−t
)
e−Mx−
(1−t)M2
2
+ lim
x→∞
Φ
(
−x−(1−t)M√
1−t
)
e−Mx−
(1−t)M2
2
= I3(x) + I4(x).
Since
lim
x→∞
Φ
(
z − x− (1− t)M√
1− t
)
= lim
x→∞
Φ
(−x− (1− t)M√
1− t
)
= lim
x→∞
e−Mx−
(1−t)M2
2 = 0,
are continuously differentiable functions, we can apply L’Hopital rule,
lim
x→∞
I3(x) = lim
x→∞
− 1√
2pi(1−t)e
− [z−x−(1−t)M ]2
2(1−t)
−Me−Mx− (1−t)M22
=
1√
2pi(1− t)M limx→∞ e
− [z−x−(1−t)M ]2
2(1−t) +Mx+
(1−t)M2
2 = 0,
lim
x→∞
I4(x) = lim
x→∞
− 1√
2pi(1−t)e
− [−x−(1−t)M ]2
2(1−t)
−Me−Mx− (1−t)M22
=
1√
2pi(1− t)M limx→∞ e
− [−x+(1−t)M ]2
2(1−t) +Mx+
(1−t)M2
2 = 0.
Therefore we have
lim
x→∞
∫ z
−∞
Γ(t, x− y)g(y)dy = lim
x→∞
(I2(x) + I3(x) + I4(x)) = 0.
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Lemma 6 Suppose f satisfies Assumption 1 and limx→∞ f(x) = d > 0, limx→−∞ f(x) =
b < 0. Let P˜ ∈ C2 : R → R, a function strictly increasing w.r.t. x, with P˜ (−∞) = 0 and
P˜ (∞) = 1 satisfying the integral equation:
P˜ (x) =
c∗√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
γ
∫ u
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds− u
2
2
}
du.
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Then, for any ε > 0 there exists xˆ such that for all x > xˆ
−γ(d− ε) < Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)− x < 0, (2.6.26)
and for any x < −xˆ
0 < Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)− x < γ(b− ε). (2.6.27)
This implies that
lim
x→±∞
Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x)
x
= 1. (2.6.28)
Proof. First we will show bounds in (2.6.26). By L’Hopital’s rule, we have
lim
x→+∞
1− P˜ (x)
1− Φ(x) = limx→+∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(x)
= lim
x→+∞
c∗eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds.
Since f , Φ and P˜ are strictly increasing functions, we know f ◦Φ−1◦ P˜ is a strictly increasing
function. As limx→∞ P˜ (x) = 1, we know
lim
x→+∞
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) = lim
x→+∞
f(x) = d > 0.
Therefore, there exists x∗ > 0 s.t. for all x > x∗, we have f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) > d2 . Thus∫ x
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds >
∫ x∗
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds+ (x− x∗)d
2
.
Hence we have
lim
x→+∞
1− P˜ (x)
1− Φ(x) = limx→+∞ c
∗eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds =∞ > 1.
Therefore there exists y∗ > 0 such that Φ−1(P˜ (x)) < x for all x > y∗.
Since Φ is strictly increasing function, the first inequality in (2.6.26) is equivalent to
P˜ (x) > Φ(x− γ(d+ ))
for all x > xˆ. Note that
lim
x→+∞
1− P˜ (x)
1− Φ(x− γ(d+ )) = limx→+∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(x− γ(d+ ))
= c∗ lim
x→+∞
eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds−x
2
2
+ 1
2
(x−γ(d+))2
= c∗e
γ2(d+)2
2 lim
x→+∞
eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds−γ(d+)x
< c∗e
γ2(d+)2
2 lim
x→+∞
e−γx = 0 < 1.
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Therefore, there exists y˜∗ > 0 such that for any x > y˜∗, we have P˜ (x) > Φ(x− γ(d+ )).
The inequality (2.6.27) is proved similarly. Indeed,
lim
x→−∞
P˜ (x)
Φ(x)
= lim
x→−∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(x)
= lim
x→−∞
c∗eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds.
Since b < 0, we have
lim
x→−∞
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) = lim
x→−∞
f(x) = b < 0.
Therefore, there exists x∗ < 0 s.t. for all x < x∗, we have f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (x) < b
2
. Thus∫ x
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds >
∫ x∗
0
f ◦ Φ−1 ◦ P˜ (s)ds+ (x− x∗) b
2
.
Hence we have
lim
x→−∞
c∗eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds =∞ > 1.
Therefore there exists y∗ < 0 such that Φ−1(P˜ (x)) < x for x < y∗.
To show the second inequality, as before, we need to show
P˜ (x) < Φ(x− γ(b− ))
for x small enough. Notice
lim
x→−∞
P˜ (x)
Φ(x− γ(b− )) = limx→−∞
P˜ ′(x)
Φ′(x− γ(b− ))
= c∗ lim
x→−∞
eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds−x
2
2
+ 1
2
(x−γ(b−))2
= c∗e
γ2(b−)2
2 lim
x→∞
eγ
∫ x
0 f◦Φ−1◦P˜ (s)ds−γ(b−)x
< c∗e
γ2(b−)2
2 lim
x→−∞
eγx = 0 < 1.
Therefore, there exists y˜∗ < 0 such that for any x < y˜∗, we have P˜ (x) < Φ(x − γ(b − )).
Thus, the statement of the Lemma holds with xˆ = max{y∗, y˜∗,−y∗,−y˜∗}.

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Chapter 3
The solution to an impulse control
problem with non-linear penalisation
of control effort
3.1 Problem formulation
We fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F,Ft,P) satisfying the usual conditions and carrying
a standard (Ft)-Brownian motion W . We denote by T the family of all (Ft)-stopping times.
An impulse control is a collection
Z = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, . . . ;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn, . . .) ,
where (τn) ⊂ T is the increasing sequence of the (Ft)-stopping times at which impulsive
action is applied to a system and the positive real-valued random variables Zn, n ≥ 1, are
the sizes of the corresponding jumps of the underlying state process. In particular, we assume
that
τn < τn+11{τn<∞} for all n ≥ 1.
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We denote by A the family of all impulse controls. Given such a control Z ∈ A, we define
the ca´gla´d process
Z¯t =
∞∑
n=1
Zn1{τn<t}. (3.1.1)
In this context, we model the stochastic dynamics of the controlled system by
Xt = x− Z¯t +Wt. (3.1.2)
The objective of the optimisation problem that we study is to minimise the performance
criterion given by
Jx(Z) = E
[
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)]
(3.1.3)
over all strategies Z, where α, δ, κ, λ > 0 are given constants. The value function of this
optimisation problem is defined by
v(x) = inf
Z∈A
Jx(Z), for x ∈ R. (3.1.4)
In view of the general theory of stochastic impulse control, the value function of the
optimisation problem that we study identifies with a classical solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
min
{
1
2
w′′(x)− δw(x) + λx2, −w(x) + inf
z>0
[
w(x− z) + 1 + κzα]} = 0. (3.1.5)
3.2 The eventual nature of the optimal control
The structure of the problem we consider suggests that it should never be optimal to exercise
any control effort if the state process takes negative values and that it should never be optimal
to make the state process jump across the origin. The first of these observations suggests
that the value function v should satisfy the boundary condition
lim
x→−∞
v(x)
(
λE
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt(x+Wt)2 dt
])−1
= lim
x→−∞
v(x)
(
λ
δ
x2 +
λ
δ2
)−1
= 1 (3.2.6)
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because the probability of the uncontrolled process hitting R+ tends to 0 as x → −∞.
Furthermore, these observations suggest that the optimal strategy should be partially char-
acterised by two strictly positive points a0 < b0. Whenever the state space process X reaches
the level b0, control should be exercised to “push” it instantaneously down to the level a0.
On the other hand, the controller should take no action as long as the state process is inside
the interval ]−∞, b0[. Accordingly, the restriction of the value function v in ]−∞, b0] should
identify with a solution to the ODE
1
2
w′′(x)− δw(x) + λx2 = 0, for x ∈ ]−∞, b0[, (3.2.7)
that satisfies the boundary condition
w(b0) = w(a0) + 1 + κ(b0 − a0)α. (3.2.8)
Every solution to the ODE (3.2.7) is given by
w(x) = Ae
√
2δx +Be−
√
2δx +
λ
δ
x2 +
λ
δ2
,
for some constants A,B ∈ R. In view of the boundary condition (3.2.6), we choose B = 0
and we look for a solution w to the HJB equation (3.1.5) whose restriction in ]−∞, b0] takes
the form
w(x) =
Ae
√
2δx + λ
δ
x2 + λ
δ2
, if x < b0
w(a0) + 1 + κ(x− a0)α, if x = b0
 , (3.2.9)
for some constant A ∈ R.
To derive a system of appropriate equations to determine the free-boundary points a0,
b0 and the constant A, we argue as follows. First, we note that the fact that b0 separates
the “wait” region ]−∞, b0[ from the “action” region to which b0 itself belongs implies that
the marginal cost of “waiting” should tend to the marginal cost of optimal “acting” as the
state process increases to b0. This observation suggests the free-boundary condition
w′(b0−) ≡
√
2δAe
√
2δb0 +
2λ
δ
b0 = ακ(b0 − a0)α−1, (3.2.10)
which is consistent with the C1 regularity associated with the so-called “principle of smooth
fit”. Furthermore, we note that the HJB equation (3.1.5) can be satisfied for x ∈ ]−∞, b0]
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only if
−w(b0) + w(y) + 1 + κ(b0 − y)α
= 0, for y = a0≥ 0, for all y ≤ b0
 ,
which implies that the function y 7→ w(y) + 1 + κ(b0 − y)α has a local minimum at y = a0
and yields
w′(a0) ≡
√
2δAe
√
2δa0 +
2λ
δ
a0 = ακ(b0 − a0)α−1. (3.2.11)
We are therefore faced with the system of equations (3.2.8), (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) for the
unknowns a0, b0 and A.
Subtracting (3.2.11) from (3.2.10), we derive the expression
A = − 2λ(b0 − a0)
δ
√
2δ
(
e
√
2δb0 − e√2δa0
) < 0. (3.2.12)
On the other hand, adding (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) side by side and using (3.2.12), we obtain
f1(b0 − a0) = f2(b0 − a0) + λ
δ
[
δ + δκ(b0 − a0)α
λ(b0 − a0) +
2√
2δ
− (a0 + b0)
]
, (3.2.13)
where
f1(y) =
1
y
− κ(α− 1)yα−1 and f2(y) = 2λ
δ
√
2δ
[√
2δy
2
coth
√
2δy
2
− 1
]
. (3.2.14)
Furthermore, we can use (3.2.12) to observe that
q(a0, b0)
= 0< 0
 ⇔ δ + δκ(b0 − a0)
α
λ(b0 − a0) +
2√
2δ
= a0 + b0< a0 + b0
 , (3.2.15)
where
q(s, x) = −w(x) + w(s) + 1 + κ(x− s)α. (3.2.16)
It follows that the system of equations (3.2.8), (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) for the unknowns a0, b0
and A is equivalent to the system of equations
(3.2.12), f1(b0 − a0) = f2(b0 − a0) and a0 + b0 = δ + δκ(b0 − a0)
α
λ(b0 − a0) +
2√
2δ
. (3.2.17)
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At this point, we should note that we have derived the system of equations (3.2.17) in a way
that is more involved than necessary because this will facilitate some of our analysis below.
The next result, which we prove in Appendix I, is concerned with the solvability of this
system of equations as well as with other issues that we will need in the following sections.
Lemma 7 Given any values of the constants λ, δ, κ, α > 0, the following statements are
true:
(I) The equation f1(y) = f2(y), where f1, f2 are defined by (3.2.14), has a unique solution
y∗ > 0.
(II) The points
a0 =
δ + δκyα∗
2λy∗
+
1√
2δ
− y∗
2
> 0 and b0 = a0 + y∗ > a0 (3.2.18)
provide the unique solution to the system of equations (3.2.17), which is equivalent to the
system of equations (3.2.8), (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) for the unknowns a0, b0 and A.
(III) There exist points y† ∈ ]0, a0[ and y† ∈ ]a0, b0[ such that the concave function ` defined
by
`(y) = w′(y) =
√
2δAe
√
2δy +
2λ
δ
y (3.2.19)
satisfies
`(y)
< 0, if y < y†> 0, if y ∈ ]y†, b0]
 and `′(y)
> 0, if y < y
†
< 0, if y ∈ ]y†, b0]
 . (3.2.20)
Furthermore,
if α ∈ ]0, 1[, then g(s, b0) < 0 for all s < a0 and gs(s, b0) > 0 for all s ≤ a0, (3.2.21)
while, if α ≥ 1, then g(s, b0)
< 0, if s < a0,> 0, if s ∈ ]a0, b0]
 , (3.2.22)
where g is the function defined by
g(s, x) = w′(s)− ακ(x− s)α−1 ≡ `(s)− ακ(x− s)α−1, for s ≤ x. (3.2.23)
(IV) The function q defined by (3.2.16) satisfies
q(s, x) > 0 for all s < x ≤ b0 such that (s, x) 6= (a0, b0). (3.2.24)
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3.3 The solution to the case with concave penalisation
of control effort (α ∈ ]0, 1])
It turns out that, if α ∈ ]0, 1], then it is never optimal to wait for any amount of time if the
state process takes values greater than b0. In particular, given any initial condition x ≥ b0,
it is optimal to jump immediately to a point a(x) < b0 that we specify below. Otherwise,
the optimal strategy takes the form we studied in the previous section. In view of these
observations, we look for a solution to the HJB equation (3.1.5) of the form
w(x) =
Ae
√
2δx + λ
δ
x2 + λ
δ2
, if x < b0
w
(
a(x)
)
+ 1 + κ
(
x− a(x))α, if x ≥ b0
 , (3.3.25)
for some C1 function a : [b0,∞[→ ]0, b0[ such that a(b0) = a0, where A < 0 is the constant
given by (3.2.12).
To determine the free-boundary function a, we first note that w can satisfy the HJB
equation (3.1.5) only if
w
(
a(x)
)
+ κ
(
x− a(x))α = min
s<x
{
w(s) + κ(x− s)α} for all x ≥ b0.
This identity will be true only if a(x) ∈ ]0, b0[ satisfies
g
(
a(x), x
)
= 0 for all x ≥ b0, (3.3.26)
where g is defined by (3.2.23).
The next result, which we prove in Appendix II, is concerned with the solution to the
HJB equation (3.1.5) when α ∈ ]0, 1].
Lemma 8 Fix any values of the constants λ, δ, κ, α > 0 such that α ∈ ]0, 1]. Also, let A < 0
and 0 < a0 < b0 be defined by (3.2.12) and (3.2.18), and let y† ∈ ]0, a0[ and y† ∈ ]a0, b0[ be
as in Lemma 7.(III). The following statements are true:
(I) If α ∈ ]0, 1[, then there exist a constant εa ∈ ]0, (b0 − a0)/2[ and a C∞ function a :
]b0 − εa,∞[→ ]y†, a0 + εa[ such that (3.3.26) holds true. Furthermore,
a(b0) = a0, lim
x→∞
a(x) = y† and a′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ ]b0 − εa,∞[. (3.3.27)
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(II) If α ∈ ]0, 1[, then let the function a be as in part (I). On the other hand, if α = 1, define
a(x) = a0 for all x ≥ b0. The function w defined by (3.3.25) is C1 in R as well as C∞ in
R \ {b0} and satisfies the HJB equation (3.1.5).
We conclude this section with the following result, which we prove in Appendix III.
Theorem 4 Consider the stochastic impulse control formulated in Section 3.1 and suppose
that α ∈ ]0, 1]. The problem’s value function is given by
v(x) = w(x) for all x ∈ R,
where w > 0 is as in Lemma 8.(II). Furthermore, the optimal impulse control strategy Z? ∈ A
takes the qualitative form discussed at the beginning of the sections and is defined sequentially
by
τ ?1 = inf{t ≥ 0 | x+Wt ≥ b0}, Z?1 = x+Wτ?1 − a(x+Wτ?1 ), (3.3.28)
τ ?2 = inf
{
t ≥ τ ?1 | a(x+Wτ?1 ) +Wt −Wτ?1 ≥ b0
}
, Z?2 = b0 − a0, (3.3.29)
and
τ ?n+1 = inf{t ≥ τ ?n | a0 +Wt −Wτ?n ≥ b0}, Z?n+1 = b0 − a0, (3.3.30)
for n ≥ 2.
3.4 The case with strictly convex penalisation of con-
trol effort (α > 1)
The situation arising when α > 1 is fundamentally different from the one we studied in
the previous section. Indeed, the following result, which we prove in Appendix IV, reveals
that the cost of a single jump can be strictly larger than the total cost incurred by multiple
simultaneous jumps of the same total size.
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Lemma 9 Consider any α > 1 fixed. The functions Kn, K : [0,∞[→ [1,∞[ defined by
Kn(z) = n+ nκ
( z
n
)α
and K(z) = Kn(z), if z ∈ [zn−1, zn[,
for n = 1, 2, . . ., where
z0 = 0 and zn = κ
−1/α
[(
1
n
)α−1
−
(
1
n+ 1
)α−1]−1/α
, if n ≥ 1, (3.4.31)
are continuous and satisfy
Kn(z) = inf
{
n∑
j=1
(
1 + κuαj
) ∣∣∣ u1, . . . , un ≥ 0 and u1 + · · ·+ un = z} , (3.4.32)
K(z) = inf
{
n∑
j=1
(
1 + κuαj
) ∣∣∣ n ∈ N \ {0}, u1, . . . , un ≥ 0 and u1 + · · ·+ un = z} .
(3.4.33)
Furthermore,
lim
n→∞
(zn+1 − zn) = κ−1/α(α− 1)−1/α (3.4.34)
and
lim
z→∞
K(z)
z
= κ1/αα(α− 1)−(α−1)/α. (3.4.35)
This result suggests that we should look for a solution to the HJB equation (3.1.5) of the
form
w(x) =
Ae
√
2δx + λ
δ
x2 + λ
δ2
, if x < b0
w
(
a(x)
)
+K
(
x− a(x))α, if x ≥ b0
 ,
for some function a : [b0,∞[ → ]0, b0[ such that a(b0) = a0, where A < 0 is the constant
given by (3.2.12). However, such a function would not satisfy the HJB equation even in the
sense of distributions because K ′ is not continuous and K ′(zn+) < K ′(zn−) for all n ≥ 1.
This observation suggests that the waiting region should involve intervals in ]b0,∞[ beyond
the interval ]−∞, b0[. On the other hand, Lemma 9 suggests that minimal costs can be
achieved only by multiple simultaneous jumps, which implies that an optimal strategy may
not exist. Despite most substantial effort in several directions, we have not managed to
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derive an explicit construction of the value function and the optimal strategy incorporating
these features.
The following result, which we prove in Appendix V, identifies the restriction of the value
function v in ]−∞, b0[ with the function w that we studied in Section 3.2.
Lemma 10 Consider the stochastic impulse control problem formulated in Section 3.1 and
suppose that α > 1. The problem’s value function satisfies
v(x) = inf
Z∈A
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZw(XTZ+)
]
, (3.4.36)
where w is defined by (3.2.9) with a0, b0 and A < 0 being as in Lemma 8.(II).
TZ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | Xt ∈ ]−∞, b0]
}
. (3.4.37)
In particular,
v(x) = w(x) > 0 for all x ∈ ]−∞, b0].
We conclude with the following result, which we prove in Appendix VI. In this theorem,
we establish an iterative procedure for deriving the value function v. This procedure also
yields a sequence of ε-optimal strategies, which arise by solving sequentially (3.4.39) and
(3.4.40).
Theorem 5 Consider the stochastic impulse control problem formulated in Section 3.1, sup-
pose that α > 1, and define
w¯0(x) = min
{
wext(x), inf
z>0
[
wext(x− z) + 1 + κzα
]}
, (3.4.38)
where wext is the extension of the function w > 0 defined by (3.2.9), which is given by
wext(x) = Ae
√
2δx +
λ
δ
x2 +
λ
δ2
, for x ∈ R,
with a0, b0 and A < 0 being as in Lemma 8.(II). Also, define
wj(x) = inf
τ∈T
E
[
λ
∫ τ
0
e−δtX˚2t dt+ e
−δτ w¯j(X˚τ )
]
, (3.4.39)
w¯j+1(x) = min
{
wj(x), inf
z>0
[
wj(x− z) + 1 + κzα
]}
, (3.4.40)
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for j ≥ 0, where X˚t = x + Wt. For each j ≥ 0, the function wj is the difference of two
convex functions and satisfies the variational inequality
min
{
1
2
w′′j (x)− δwj(x) + λx2, w¯j(x)− wj(x)
}
= 0 (3.4.41)
in the sense of distributions. Furthermore,
w¯j(x) ≥ wj(x) ≥ w¯j+1(x) for all j ≥ 0 and lim
j→∞
wj(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R. (3.4.42)
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Appendix I: proof of Lemma 7
Proof of (I). The calculations
f ′2(y) =
2λe
√
2δy
δ(e
√
2δy − 1)2
[
sinh
√
2δy −
√
2δy
]
> 0,
lim
y↓0
f2(y) = 0 and lim
y→∞
f2(y) =∞,
reveal that f2 is strictly increasing from 0 to ∞ as y increases from 0 to ∞. Combining this
observation with the calculations
f ′1(y) = −
1
y2
− κ(α− 1)2yα−2 < 0,
lim
y→∞
f1(y) =
0, if α ≤ 1−∞, if α > 1
 and limy↓0 f1(y) =∞,
we can see that there exists a unique y∗ > 0 such that
f1(y)− f2(y)

< 0, if y > y∗
= 0, if y = y∗
> 0, if y ∈ ]0, y∗[
 . (3.5.43)
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Proof of (II). The points a0, b0 given by (3.2.18) are the unique solution to the correspond-
ing system of equations appearing in (3.2.17) with b0 > a0. Therefore, they give rise to the
unique solution to the system of equations (3.2.8), (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) for the unknowns
a0, b0 and A. To complete the proof of this part, we need to show that a0 > 0. To this end,
it suffices to show that
b0 + a0 =
δ + δκyα∗
λy∗
+
2√
2δ
> y∗ = b0 − a0. (3.5.44)
In view of the identity
δ + δκyα∗
λy∗
+
2√
2δ
= y∗ coth
√
2δy∗
2
+
δκαyα−1∗
λ
,
which follows from the equation f1(y∗) = f2(y∗), we can see that (3.5.44) is equivalent to
y∗ coth
√
2δy∗
2
+
δκαyα−1∗
λ
> y∗,
which is true because coth
√
2δy∗
2
> 1.
Proof of (III). The function ` defined by (3.2.19) is plainly concave because A < 0.
Combining this observation with the inequalities
`(0) =
√
2δA < 0 and `(a0) = `(b0)
(3.2.10)
= ακ(b0 − a0)α−1 > 0,
we obtain (3.2.20). We prove (3.2.21) later (see “Proof of (3.5.46) if α ∈ ]0, 1[” further
below).
Proof of (IV). In view of (I) and the observations that
lim
s→−∞
q(s, x) =∞ and lim
s↑x
q(s, x) = 1,
we can see that (3.2.24) will follow if we show that
q has no strictly negative minimum in
{
(s, x) ∈ R2 | s < x < b0
}
, (3.5.45)
and q(s, b0) > 0 for all s ∈ ]−∞, b0[ \ {a0}. (3.5.46)
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To prove (3.5.45), we argue by contradiction and we assume that there exists (s¯, x¯) with
s¯ < x¯ < b0 such that q(s¯, x¯) < 0 is a local minimum of q. The first order conditionsqs(s¯, x¯) = 0qx(s¯, x¯) = 0
 ⇒
w
′(s¯) ≡ `(s¯) = ακ(x¯− s¯)α−1
w′(x¯) ≡ `(x¯) = ακ(x¯− s¯)α−1
 , (3.5.47)
the inequality q(s¯, x¯) < 0 and the same analysis as the one leading to (3.2.17) gives rise to
the inequalities
s¯+ x¯ >
δ + δκ(x¯− s¯)α
λ(x¯− s¯) +
2√
2δ
and f1(x¯− s¯) < f2(x¯− s¯).
The second of these inequalities and (3.5.43) imply that x¯− s¯ > y∗ = b0 − a0. On the other
hand, the first order conditions (3.5.47) and (3.2.20) in (III) imply that
s¯ ∈ [a0, y†[ and x¯ ∈ ]y†, b0] ⇒ x¯− s¯ ≤ b0 − a0 = y∗,
which is a contradiction.
To prove (3.5.46), we define
q¯(s) = q(s, b0) = −w(b0) + Ae
√
2δs +
λ
δ
s2 +
λ
δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(s)
+1 + κ(b0 − s)α, for s ≤ b0,
and we observe that
lim
s→−∞
q¯(s) =∞, q¯(a0) = 0 and q¯(b0) = 1. (3.5.48)
Also, we calculate
q¯′(s) = g(s, b0) =
√
2δAe
√
2δs +
2λ
δ
s− ακ(b0 − s)α−1, (3.5.49)
q¯′′(s) = gs(s, b0) = 2δAe
√
2δs +
2λ
δ
+ α(α− 1)κ(b0 − s)α−2, (3.5.50)
q¯′′′(s) = (2δ)
3
2Ae
√
2δs − α(α− 1)(α− 2)κ(b0 − s)α−3, (3.5.51)
and we note that
lim
s→−∞
q¯′(s) = −∞ and q¯′(a0) (3.2.11)= 0. (3.5.52)
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To complete the proof, we need to distinguish between two different cases.
Proof of (3.5.46) if α ∈ ]0, 1[. Combining the concavity of q¯′ = g(·, b0), which follows from
(3.5.51) and the fact that A < 0, with (3.5.52), the observation that lims↑b0 q¯
′(s) = −∞,
and the fact that q¯(a0) < q¯(b0) (see (3.5.48)), we can conclude that there exists a unique
s† ∈ ]a0, b0[ such that
q¯′(s) = g(s, b0)
> 0, if s ∈ ]a0, s†[< 0, if s ∈ ]−∞, a0[ ∪ ]s†, b0[
 .
These inequalities and (3.5.48) imply (3.5.46). On the other hand, these inequalities and the
concavity of q¯′ = g(·, b0) imply (3.2.21).
Proof of (3.5.46) if α ≥ 1. In this case, (3.2.20) and (3.5.50) reveal that q¯′ is strictly
increasing in ]−∞, a0[, which, combined with (3.5.52), implies that
q¯′(s) = g(s, b0) < 0 for all s ∈ ]−∞, a0[.
On the other hand, we can use (3.2.20) to calculate
q¯′(s) = `(s)− ακ(b0 − s)α−1 > `(a0)− ακ(b0 − a0)α−1 = q¯′(a0) = 0 for all s ∈ ]a0, b0[.
These inequalities and (3.5.48) imply (3.5.46) as well as (3.2.22). 2
3.5.2 Appendix II: proof of Lemma 8
Proof of (I). Suppose that α ∈ ]0, 1[. The calculations
gx(s, x) = −α(α− 1)κ(x− s)α−2 > 0 for all s < x, (3.5.53)
and lim
x↓s
g(s, x) = −∞, lim
x→∞
g(s, x) = `(s), for all s ∈ R (3.5.54)
imply that, given any s,
there exists a unique a(s) ∈ ]s,∞[ such that g(s, a(s)) = 0 if and only if `(s) > 0.
This observation and (3.2.20) implies that the equation g(s, x) = 0 for x > s defines uniquely
a continuous function a : ]y†, b0[→ R+ such that a(s) > s. In particular,
lim
s↓y†
a(s) =∞ and a(a0) = b0, (3.5.55)
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thanks to (3.2.20) and (3.2.11), respectively. Furthermore, these considerations and the first
inequality in (3.2.21) imply that
a(s) > b0 for all s ∈ ]y†, a0[. (3.5.56)
In view of second inequality in (3.2.21) and the calculation
gsx(s, x) = α(α− 1)(α− 2)κ(x− s)α−3 > 0 for all s < x,
we can see that gs(s, x) > 0 for all s ≤ a0 and x ≥ b0. Combining this observation with
(3.5.56) and the continuity of the functions gs and a, we can see that there exists εa ∈
]0, b0 − a0[ such that
gs
(
s, a(s)
)
> 0 for all s ∈ ]y†, a0 + εa[. (3.5.57)
Differentiating the identity g
(
s, a(s)
)
= 0 with respect to s and using this inequality and
(3.5.53), we obtain
a′(s) = −gs
(
s, a(s)
)
gx
(
s, a(s)
) < 0 for all s ∈ ]y†, a0 + εa[. (3.5.58)
These considerations imply that, given any εa ∈
]
0, b0−a(a0 +εa)
[
, the function a defined
by
a(x) = a−1(x), for x > b0 − εa,
has all of the properties claimed in the statement of part (I) of the proposition.
For future reference, we also note that differentiation of (3.3.26) yields the expression
a′(x) = −gx
(
a(x), x
)
gs
(
a(x), x
) = α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2
`′
(
a(x)
)
+ α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2 < 0 for all x > b0. (3.5.59)
Proof of (II). Consider the function w defined by (3.3.25) for A, a0, b0 and a as in the
statement of the proposition. Before addressing the main issues of the proof, we make some
preliminary calculations that we will need in several places. First, we note that
w′(x) = w′
(
a(x)
)
a′(x) + ακ
(
x− a(x))α−1(1− a′(x))
= g
(
a(x), x
)
a′(x) + ακ
(
x− a(x))α−1
(3.3.26)
= ακ
(
x− a(x))α−1 for all x > b0. (3.5.60)
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Combining these identities with the definition (3.2.23) of g and (3.3.26), we can see that
w′(x) = w′
(
a(x)
) ≡ `(a(x)) for all x > b0. (3.5.61)
On the other hand, differentiating (3.5.60), we obtain
w′′(x) = α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2[1− a′(x)] for all x > b0. (3.5.62)
The function w is plainly C∞ in R \ {b0}. Also, it is C1 because
lim
x↓b0
w(x) = lim
x↓b0
[
w
(
a(x)
)
+ 1 + κ
(
x− a(x))α] = w(a0) + 1 + κ(b0 − a0)α (3.2.8)= lim
x↑b0
w(x)
and
lim
x↓b0
w′(x)
(3.5.60)
= ακ(b0 − a0)α−1 (3.2.10)= lim
x↑b0
w′(x).
In view of its definition and Lemma 7.(IV), we will prove that the function w defined by
(3.3.25) satisfies the HJB equation (3.1.5) if we show that
q(s, x)
(3.2.16)≡ −w(x) + w(s) + 1 + κ(x− s)α ≥ 0 for all s < x and x > b0, (3.5.63)
and
1
2
w′′(x)− δw(x) + λx2 ≥ 0 for all x > b0. (3.5.64)
Proof of (3.5.63) if α ∈ ]0, 1[. Fix any x ≥ b0. Combining the concavity of g(·, x), which
follows from the calculation
gss(s, x) = (2δ)
3
2Ae
√
2δs − α(α− 1)(α− 2)κ(x− s)α−3
and the fact that A < 0, with the observations that
lim
s→−∞
g(s, x) = −∞, g(a(x), x) = 0 and lim
s↑x
g(s, x) = −∞
and (3.5.57) (recall that a = a−1), we can conclude that there exists a unique s†(s) ∈ ]a(x), x[
such that
qs(s, x) = g(s, x)
> 0, if s ∈ ]a0, s†[< 0, if s ∈ ]−∞, a0[ ∪ ]s†, x[
 .
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Combining these inequalities with the observations that
lim
s→−∞
q(s, x) =∞, q(a(x), x) = 0 and q(x, x) = 1,
we can see that (3.5.63) is indeed true.
Proof of (3.5.63) if α = 1. In this case, the required result follows immediately once we
combine Lemma 7.(IV) with the observation that
q(s, x) = −w(x) + w(s ∨ b0) + κ
(
x− (s ∨ b0)
)
+ q(s, s ∨ b0)
= q(s, s ∨ b0) for all s < x and x > b0.
Proof of (3.5.64) if α ∈ ]0, 1[. We first use (3.5.61) to calculate
w′′(x) = `′
(
a(x)
)
a′(x)
(3.5.59)
=
α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2`′(a(x))
`
(
a(x)
)
+ α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2 , for all x > b0,
and [
`
(
a(x)
)
+ α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2]2w′′′(x)
= α2(α− 1)2κ2(x− a(x))2α−4`′′(a(x))a′(x)
+ α(α− 1)(α− 2)κ(x− a(x))α−3[`′(a(x))]2[1− a′(x)]2
> 0 for all x > b0,
the inequality following thanks to the concavity of ` (see Lemma 7.(III)) and the fact that a
is strictly decreasing (see part (I) of this proposition). In view of these calculations and the
fact that A < 0, we can see that
d
dx
[
1
2
w′′(x)− δw(x) + λx2
]
(3.5.61)
=
1
2
w′′′(x)− δ`(a(x))+ 2λx
(3.2.19)
=
1
2
w′′′(x)− δ
√
2δAe
√
2δa(x) + 2λ
[
x− a(x)]
> 0 for all x > b0. (3.5.65)
It follows that (3.5.64) is true if and only if
1
2
w′′(b0+)− δw(b0) + λb20 ≥ 0 ⇔ w′′(b0+) ≥ w′′(b0−). (3.5.66)
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To show that this inequality is indeed true, we note that (3.2.24) in Lemma 7.(IV) and
the definition (3.3.25) of w imply that
q
(
a(x), x
) > 0, if x ∈ ]b0 − εa, b0[= 0, if x ≥ b0
 .
Since q is C1,1 and a is C∞, these inequalities imply that
lim
x↑b0
d2q
(
a(x), x
)
dx2
≥ 0.
Combining this observation with the calculation
lim
x↑b0
d2q
(
a(x), x
)
dx2
= lim
x↑b0
d
[
g
(
a(x), x
)
a′(x) + qx
(
a(x), x
)]
dx
= lim
x↑b0
[
−w′′(x) + α(α− 1)κ(x− a(x))α−2[1− a′(x)]]
= −w′′(b0−) + α(α− 1)κ(b0 − a0)α−2
[
1− a′(b0)
]
(3.5.62)
= −w′′(b0−) + w′′(b0+),
where we have used the identities
qs
(
a(x), x
)
= g
(
a(x), x
)
= 0,
we obtain (3.5.66).
Proof of (3.5.64) if α = 1. In this case, w′′(x) = 0 for all x > b0 and (3.5.65) follows
immediately. On the other hand, (3.5.66) is plainly true because w′′(b0−) = `′(b0) < 0 (see
(3.2.20) in Lemma 7.(III)).
3.5.3 Appendix III: proof of Theorem 4
Throughout the proof, we consider any initial condition x ∈ R fixed. Let Z ∈ A be any
admissible impulse control strategy such that Jx(Z) <∞. The finiteness of such a strategy’s
performance implies that
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtX2t dt
]
<∞. (3.5.67)
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Using Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
e−δTw(XT+) = w(x) +
∫ T
0
e−δt
[
1
2
w′′(Xt)− δw(Xt)
]
dt+
∫
[0,T ]
e−δtw′(Xt) dZ¯t
+
∫ T
0
e−δtw′(Xt) dWt +
∑
t∈[0,T ]
e−δt
[
w(Xt+)− w(Xt)− w′(Xt)∆Xt
]
= w(x) +
∫ T
0
e−δt
[
1
2
w′′(Xt)− δw(Xt)
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
e−δtw′(Xt) dWt +
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
[
w(Xτn − Zn)− w(Xτn)
]
1{τn≤T},
the second equality following from the fact that ∆Xs ≡ Xs+−Xs = ∆Z¯s and (3.1.1). These
identities imply that
λ
∫ T
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤T}
= w(x)− e−δTw(XT+) +
∫ T
0
e−δt
[
1
2
w′′(Xt)− δw(Xt) + λX2t
]
dt+
∫ T
0
e−δtw′(Xt) dWt
+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
[
w(Xτn − Zn)− w(Xτn) + 1 + κZαn
]
1{τn≤T}. (3.5.68)
Since w satisfies the HJB equation (3.1.5),
λ
∫ T
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤T}
≥ w(x)− e−δTw(XT+) +
∫ T
0
e−δtw′(Xt) dWt. (3.5.69)
In view of the definition (3.3.25) of w, we can see that there exists a constant C > 0 such
that [
w′(x)
]2
+
∣∣w(x)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |x|2) for all x ∈ R.
In view of these estimates, Itoˆ’s isometry and (3.5.67) imply that
E
[(∫ T
0
e−δtw′(Xt) dWt
)2]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−2δt
∣∣w′(Xt)∣∣2 dt]
≤ C E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
1 +X2t
)
dt
]
<∞
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and
lim
T→∞
e−δTE
[∣∣w(XT+)∣∣] ≤ lim
T→∞
C
(
e−δT + E
[
e−δTX2T
])
= 0. (3.5.70)
The first of these observations implies that the stochastic integral in (3.5.69) is a square
integrable martingale. Taking expectations in (3.5.69), we therefore obtain
E
[
λ
∫ T
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤T}
]
≥ w(x)− E[e−δTw(XT+)].
Passing to the limit using the monotone convergence theorem and (3.5.70), we derive
Jx(Z) = E
[
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)] ≥ w(x),
which establishes the inequality
v(x) ≥ w(x). (3.5.71)
To prove the reverse inequality and establish the optimality of the impulse control strat-
egy Z∗ defined by (3.3.28)–(3.3.30), we first note that (τ ∗n+1 − τ ∗n, n ≥ 2) is a sequence of
independent and identically distributed random variables, each having the same distribution
as the first hitting time
Tb0−a0(B) = inf{t ≥ 0 | Bt ≥ b0 − a0},
where B is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion starting from 0. In particular,
E
[
e−δ(τ
∗
n+1−τ∗n)
]
= E
[
e−δTb0−a0 (B)
]
= e−
√
2δ(b0−a0)
and
E
[
e−δτ
∗
n
]
= E
[
e−δτ
∗
2
] n−2∏
j=1
E
[
e−δ(τ
∗
j+2−τ∗j+1)
]
= E
[
e−δτ
∗
2
]
e−(n−2)
√
2δ(b0−a0)
for all n ≥ 2. Furthermore, the state process X∗ associated with Z∗ satisfies
E
[∫ τ∗n+1
τ∗n
e−δtX∗t
2 dt
]
= E
[
e−δτ
∗
n
∫ τ∗n+1
τ∗n
e−δ(t−τ
∗
n)(a0 +Wt −Wτ∗n)2 dt
]
= E
[
e−δτ
∗
n
]
E
[∫ Tb0−a0 (B)
0
e−δt(a0 +Bt)2 dt
]
for all n ≥ 2.
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In view of these observations and the monotone convergence theorem, we can see that
E
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−δτ
∗
n
(
1 + κZ∗n
α
)]
= E
[
2∑
n=1
e−δτ
∗
n
(
1 + κZ∗n
α
)]
+
[
1 + κ(b0 − a0)α
] ∞∑
n=3
E
[
e−δτ
∗
n
]
<∞
and
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtX∗t
2 dt
]
= E
[∫ τ∗2
0
e−δtX∗t
2 dt
]
+ E
[∫ Tb0−a0 (B)
0
e−δt(a0 +Bt)2 dt
] ∞∑
n=3
E
[
e−δτ
∗
n
]
<∞.
It follows that Jx(Z
∗) <∞.
To proceed further, we note that the impulse control strategy Z? is such that
1
2
w′′(X?t )− δw(X?t ) + λX?t 2 = 0 for all t ∈ R+ \ {τ ?n, n ≥ 1},
and w(X?τn − Z?n)− w(X?τn) + 1 + κZ?nα = 0 for all n ≥ 1.
In view of these observations, we can see that (3.5.68) implies that
λ
∫ T
0
e−δtX?t
2 dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZ?n
α
)
1{τ?n≤T}
= w(x)− e−δTw(X?T+) +
∫ T
0
e−δtw′(X?t ) dWt.
Using this identity instead of the inequality (3.5.69) and following the same steps as the ones
leading to (3.5.71), we can see that Jx(Z
?) = w(x). It follows that
v(x) ≤ w(x), (3.5.72)
which, combined with (3.5.71), implies that v(x) = w(x) as well as the optimality of Z?.
3.5.4 Appendix IV: proof of Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 9. The identity (3.4.32) follows from the observation that, given any
α > 1, z ≥ 0 and n ≥ 2,
min
u1,...,un≥0
u1+···+un=z
n∑
j=1
(1 + κuαj ) = n+ nκ
( z
n
)α
. (3.5.73)
80
For n = 2, this result follows immediately from the equivalence
d
du
[(
1 + κuα
)
+
(
1 + κ(z − u)α)] = 0 ⇔ u = z
2
.
Given any n > 2, the first order conditions
∂
∂ui
(
n−1∑
j=1
(
1 + κuαj
)
+
[
1 + κ
(
z −
n−1∑
j=1
uj
)α])
= 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, (3.5.74)
are equivalent to ui+
∑n−1
j=1 uj = z, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1. Therefore, the first order conditions
(3.5.74) are equivalent to u1 = u2 = · · · = un−1. Combining this result with the observation
that un = z −
∑n−1
j=1 uj = u1, we can see that the minimum on the left-hand side of (3.5.73)
is achieved by the choice u1 = · · · = un = zn .
We can see that (3.4.33) is indeed true by combining (3.4.32) with the fact that the
inequality
n+ nκ
( z
n
)α
> (n+ 1) + (n+ 1)κ
(
z
n+ 1
)α
is equivalent to the inequality z > zn.
To show (3.4.34), we use the Maclaurin series expansion
(1 + y)ζ = 1 + ζy +
ζ(ζ − 1)
2
y2 + o(y2), for |y| < 1,
where ζ is a constant, to calculate
zn = κ
−1/αn(α−1)/α
[
1−
(
1 +
1
n
)−(α−1)]−1/α
= κ−1/αn(α−1)/α
[
α− 1
n
− α(α− 1)
2n2
+ o(n−2)
]−1/α
(3.5.75)
as well as
zn−1 = κ−1/αn(α−1)/α
[(
1− 1
n
)−(α−1)
− 1
]−1/α
= κ−1/αn(α−1)/α
[
α− 1
n
+
α(α− 1)
2n2
+ o(n−2)
]−1/α
. (3.5.76)
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In view of these calculations, we can see that
lim
n→∞
(zn − zn−1)
= κ−1/α(α− 1)−1/α lim
n→∞
n(α−1)/αn1/α
[(
1− α
2n
+ o(n−1)
)−1/α
−
(
1 +
α
2n
+ o(n−1)
)−1/α]
= κ−1/α(α− 1)−1/α lim
n→∞
n
[(
1 +
1
2n
+ o(n−1)
)
−
(
1− 1
2n
+ o(n−1)
)]
,
and (3.4.34) follows.
Given any z > 0, there exists n ≥ 1 such that zn−1 ≤ z < zn. For any such pair of z and
n,
K(zn−1)
zn
<
K(z)
z
<
K(zn)
zn−1
because K is strictly increasing. In view of this observation, we can see that (3.4.35) will
follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
K(zn−1)
zn
= lim
n→∞
K(zn)
zn−1
= κ1/αα(α− 1)−(α−1)/α,
namely, if we prove that
lim
n→∞
n
zn
[
1 + κ
(zn−1
n
)α]
= lim
n→∞
n
zn−1
[
1 + κ
(zn
n
)α]
= κ1/αα(α− 1)−(α−1)/α. (3.5.77)
To this end, we calculate
lim
n→∞
n
zn
(3.5.75)
= lim
n→∞
κ1/αn1/α
[
α− 1
n
− α(α− 1)
2n2
+ o(n−2)
]1/α
= κ1/α(α− 1)1/α,
lim
n→∞
n
zn−1
(3.5.76)
= lim
n→∞
κ1/αn1/α
[
α− 1
n
+
α(α− 1)
2n2
+ o(n−2)
]1/α
= κ1/α(α− 1)1/α,
and (3.5.77) follows.
3.5.5 Appendix V: proof of Lemma 10
Proof of (I). First, we consider the function u defined by
u(x) =
w(x), if x ≤ b0w(b0) + `(b0)(x− b0), if x > b0
 ,
82
where w is given by (3.2.9). This function is C1 in R as well as C∞ in R \ {b0}, and satisfies
the inequality
min
{
1
2
u′′(x)− δu(x) + λx2, −u(x) + inf
z>0
[
u(x− z) + 1 + κzα]} ≥ 0. (3.5.78)
In view of its construction and Lemma 7.(IV), we will establish (3.5.78) if we prove that
q˜(s, x) = −u(x) + u(s) + 1 + κ(x− s)α ≥ 0 for all s < x and x > b0, (3.5.79)
and
1
2
u′′(x)− δu(x) + λx2 ≥ 0 for all x > b0. (3.5.80)
To show (3.5.79), we consider any x > b0 and any s < x and we calculate
q˜x(s, x) = −`(b0) + ακ(x− s)α−1
= −g(b0 − (x− s), b0)
(3.2.22)
=
> 0, if b0 − (x− s) < a0 ⇔ x > b0 − a0 + s< 0, if b0 − (x− s) ∈ ]a0, b0] ⇔ x ∈ [s, b0 − a0 + s[
 .
These inequalities imply that
if x > b0 ∨ (b0 − a0 + s), then q˜(s, x) >
q(s, b0), if s ≤ a0q˜(s, b0 − a0 + s), if s > a0
 ,
and, if x ∈ [s, b0 − a0 + s[ ∩ [b0,∞[, then q˜(s, x) > q˜(s, b0 − a0 + s),
where q is defined by (3.2.16). In view of these implications and Lemma 7.(IV), we can see
that (3.5.79) will follow if we prove that
q˜(s, b0 − a0 + s) ≥ 0 for all s > a0. (3.5.81)
To this end, we distinguish between two cases. If b0 < s ≤ b0 − a0 + s, then
q˜(s, b0 − a0 + s) = −`(b0)(b0 − a0) + 1 + κ(b0 − a0)α
(3.2.8)
= −`(b0)(b0 − a0) + w(b0)− w(a0)
=
∫ b0
a0
[
`(s)− `(b0)
]
ds
(3.2.20)
> 0.
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On the other hand, if a0 < s < b0 < b0 − a0 + s, then the calculation
dq˜(s, b0 − a0 + s)
ds
=
d
(−w(b0)− `(b0)(s− a0) + w(s) + 1 + κ(b0 − a0)α)
ds
= −`(b0) + `(s)
(3.2.20)
> 0
implies that
q˜(s, b0 − a0 + s) > q˜(a0, b0) = q(a0, b0) (3.2.8)= 0.
In either case, (3.5.81) holds true, and (3.5.79) has been proved.
In view of the calculations
d
dx
[
1
2
u′′(x)− δu(x) + λx2
]
= −δ`(b0) + 2λx
(3.2.19)
= −δ
√
2δAe
√
2δb0 + 2λ
[
x− b0
]
> 0 for all x > b0,
we can see that (3.5.80) is true if and only if
1
2
u′′(b0+)− δu(b0) + λb20 ≥ 0 ⇔ 0 ≥ w′′(b0−) = `′(b0),
which is true thanks to (3.2.20) in Lemma 7.(III).
To proceed further, we consider any initial condition x ∈ R and any impulse control
strategy Z ∈ A. Using Itoˆ’s formula and (3.5.78), we can follow the same steps as the ones
we used to derive (3.5.69) in Appendix III to obtain
λ
∫ T
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤T}
≥ λ
∫ TZ∧T
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ∧T}
+ e−δ(TZ∧T )u(X(TZ∧T )+)− e−δTu
(
XT+
)
+
∫ T
TZ∧T
e−δtu′(Xt) dWt,
where TZ is the stopping time defined by (3.4.37). Following exactly the same arguments as
in the proof of (3.5.71) in Appendix III, we can see that this inequality implies that
Jx(Z) ≥ E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZw(XTZ+)
]
,
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where we have also used the fact that w(XTZ+) = u(XTZ+). It follows that
v(x) ≥ inf
Z∈A
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZw(XTZ+)
]
. (3.5.82)
To derive the reverse inequality, we consider any initial condition x ∈ R and any impulse
control strategy Z ∈ A, and we denote by Z˜ ∈ A the impulse control strategy that is identical
to Z up to the stopping time TZ and then repositions the state process X down to the level
a0 whenever this hits the level b0 after time TZ. This strategy can be constructed as follows.
First, we define
Z¯
(i)
t =
∞∑
n=1
Zn1{τn<t}1{τn≤TZ},
τ
(ii)
1 = inf
{
t ≥ TZ | XTZ+ +Wt −WTZ+ ≥ b0
}
, Z
(ii)
1 = b0 − a0,
τ
(ii)
n+1 = inf{t ≥ τ (ii)n | a0 +Wt −Wτ (ii)n ≥ b0}, Z
(ii)
n+1 = b0 − a0, for n ≥ 1,
and
Z¯
(ii)
t =
∞∑
n=1
Z(ii)n 1{τ (ii)n <t}.
We then define Z˜ =
(
τ˜1, τ˜2, . . . , τ˜n, . . . ; Z˜1, Z˜2, . . . , Z˜n, . . .
)
, where τ˜n are the stopping times
at which the jumps of the process ˜¯Z = Z¯(i) + Z¯(ii) occur and Z˜n are the corresponding jump
sizes. Furthermore, we denote by A˜ the family of all such impulse control strategies, and we
note that A˜ ⊆ A. In particular, we note that
TZ˜ = TZ, X˜t1{t≤TZ˜} = Xt1{t≤TZ} and Z˜n1{τ˜n≤TZ˜} = Zn1{τn≤TZ}. (3.5.83)
Using the fact that the restriction of u in ]−∞, b0] identifies with w and satisfies (3.5.78)
with equality, and following exactly the same arguments as in the proof of (3.5.72) in Ap-
pendix III with u in place of w, we can see that
Jx(Z˜) = E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZw(XTZ+)
]
.
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It follows that
v(x) = inf
Z∈A
Jx(Z) ≤ inf
Z˜∈A˜
Jx(Z˜)
= inf
Z∈A
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZw(XTZ+)
]
,
where we have also used (3.5.83). Combining this inequality with (3.5.82), we obtain the
required result.
3.5.6 Appendix VI: proof of Theorem 5
The inequalities w¯j ≥ wj ≥ w¯j+1 for all j ≥ 0 are straightforward to see. On the other hand,
the regularity of the functions wj and the fact that they satisfy the variational inequality
(3.4.41) follow from Theorem 6.3 of Lamberton and Zervos [40]. In particular, wj satisfies
wj(x) = E
[
λ
∫ T ?j
0
e−δtX˚2t dt+ e
−δT ?j w¯j(X˚T ?j )
]
, (3.5.84)
where
X˚t = x+Wt and T
?
j = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | wj(X˚t) = w¯j(X˚t)
}
, (3.5.85)
Furthermore, the continuity of the function z 7→ wj(x− z) + 1 + κzα and the fact that this
function tends to∞ as z increases to∞ imply that there exists a function zj : [b0,∞[→ [0,∞[
such that
zj(x) = arg min
z≥0
[
wj(x− z) + 1 + κzα
]
. (3.5.86)
Also, we note that the definitions of w¯j in (3.4.38), (3.4.40) and Lemma 7.(IV) imply that
w¯j(x) = wext(x) for all x ≤ b0 and j ≥ 0. (3.5.87)
We now show by induction that, given any j ≥ 0,
wj(x) = inf
Z∈Aj
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt
+
j∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZwext(XTZ+)
]
, (3.5.88)
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where
TZ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | Xt ≤ b0
}
and Aj ⊆ A is the family of all admissible impulse control strategies Z such that τj+2 =∞,
namely, the class of all strategies that involve a maximum of j + 1 jumps. To establish
(3.5.88) for j = 0, we first note that, given any (Ft)-stopping times
¯
T ≤ T¯ ,
E
[
λ
∫ T¯
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δT¯wext(X˚T¯ )
]
= E
[
λ
∫
¯
T∧T¯
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δ(
¯
T∧T¯ )wext(X˚
¯
T∧T¯ )
]
(3.5.89)
because the process
(
λ
∫ t
0
e−δsX2s ds+ e
−δtwext(X˚t)
)
is a square-integrable martingale. In
view of this observation, the definitions (3.4.38), (3.4.39) of w¯0, w0, we can see that, given
any Z ∈ A0,
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ1(1 + κZα1 )1{τ1≤TZ} + e−δTZwext(XTZ+)]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ1∧TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ1(1 + κZα1 )1{τ1≤TZ} + e−δ(τ1∧TZ)wext(X(τ1∧TZ)+)]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ1∧TZ
0
e−δtX˚2t dt
+ e−δτ1
[
wext(X˚τ1 − Z1) + 1 + κZα1
]
1{τ1≤TZ} + e
−δTZwext(X˚TZ)1{TZ<τ1}
]
≥ inf
τ∈T
E
[
λ
∫ τ
0
e−δtX˚2t dt+ e
−δτ w¯0(X˚τ )
]
= w0(x). (3.5.90)
To derive the reverse inequality, we consider the strategy Z? ∈ A0 given by
τ ?1 = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | w0(X˚t) = w¯0(X˚t) and w¯0(X˚t) > wext(Xt)
}
and Z?1 = z0(X˚τ?1 ),
where z0 is defined by (3.5.86). The definition (3.4.38) of w¯0 and the identity (3.5.87) imply
that the stopping time T ?0 defined by (3.5.85) satisfies
T ?0 ≤ τ ?1 ∧ TZ? and T ?0 1{τ?1≤TZ?} = τ ?1 1{τ?1≤TZ?}.
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In view of this observation, (3.5.87) and (3.5.89) we can see that
E
[
λ
∫ TZ?
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ?1
(
1 + κZ?1
α
)
1{τ?1≤TZ?} + e
−δTZ?wext(XTZ?+)
]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ?1∧TZ?
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ?1
(
1 + κZ?1
α
)
1{τ?1≤TZ?} + e
−δ(τ?1∧TZ? )wext(X(τ?1∧TZ? )+)
]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ?1∧TZ?
0
e−δtX˚2t dt
+ e−δτ
?
1
[
wext(X˚τ?1 − Z?1) + 1 + κZ?1α
]
1{τ?1≤TZ?} + e
−δTZ?wext(X˚TZ? )1{TZ?<τ?1 }
]
= E
[
λ
∫ T ?0
0
e−δtX˚2t dt
+ e−δT
?
0
[
wext(X˚T ?0 − Z?1) + 1 + κZ?1α
]
1{τ?1≤TZ?} + e
−δT ?0wext(X˚T ?0 )1{TZ?<τ?1 }
]
= E
[
λ
∫ T ?0
0
e−δtX˚2t dt+ e
−δT ?0 w¯0(X˚T ?0 )
]
= w0(x). (3.5.91)
Combining these identities with (3.5.90), we obtain (3.5.88) for j = 0.
To proceed further, we assume that (3.5.88) holds true for j = k− 1, for some k ≥ 1. An
impulse control strategy Z ∈ Ak involves a maximum of k + 1 jumps. The evolution of the
driving Brownian motion after time τ1 at which the first jump occurs is independent of the
evolution of the state process prior to time τ1. Therefore, we may assume in what follows
that τn and Zn are measurable with respect to the information flow obtained by Xτ1+ and
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the process
(
(Wτ1+t −Wτ1)1{τ1<∞}
)
. In view of this observation
E
[
λ
∫ TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+
k+1∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZwext(XTZ+)
]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ1∧TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ1(1 + κZα1 )1{τ1≤TZ}
+ E
[
λ
∫ TZ
τ1∧TZ
e−δtX2t dt
+
k+1∑
n=2
e−δτn
(
1 + κZαn
)
1{τn≤TZ} + e
−δTZwext(XTZ+)
∣∣∣∣Fτ1∧TZ]]
≥ E
[
λ
∫ τ1∧TZ
0
e−δtX2t dt+ e
−δτ1(1 + κZα1 )1{τ1≤TZ} + e−δ(τ1∧TZ)wk−1(X(τ1∧TZ)+)]
= E
[
λ
∫ τ1∧TZ
0
e−δtX˚2t dt
+ e−δτ1
[
wk−1(X˚τ1 − Z1) + 1 + κZα1
]
1{τ1≤TZ} + e
−δTZwk−1(X˚TZ)1{TZ<τ1}
]
≥ inf
τ∈T
E
[
λ
∫ τ
0
e−δtX˚2t dt+ e
−δτ w¯k(X˚τ )
]
= wk(x). (3.5.92)
Combining the arguments we have used in (3.5.91) and (3.5.92), we can see that the strategy
Z? ∈ Ak given by
τ ?n = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | wk+1−n(X˚t) = w¯k+1−n(X˚t) and w¯k+1−n(X˚t) > wk−n(Xt)
}
,
Z?n = zk+1−n(X˚τ?n),
for n = 1, . . . , k + 1, satisfies
E
[
λ
∫ TZ?
0
e−δtX2t dt+
k+1∑
n=1
e−δτn
(
1 + κZ?n
α
)
1{τn≤TZ?} + e
−δTZ?wext(XTZ?+)
]
= wk(x).
This identity and (3.5.92) imply that (3.5.88) holds true for j = k. It follows that (3.5.88)
is true for all j ≥ 0.
To establish the fact that limj→∞wj(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R and complete the proof,
we first note that limj→∞wj(x) exists because the sequence
(
wj(x)
)
is decreasing. The
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inequality limj→∞wj(x) ≥ v(x) follows immediately from (3.5.88) and the fact that Aj ⊆
Aj+1 for all j ≥ 0. To prove the reverse inequality, we consider any ε-optimal strategy
Zε = (τ ε1 , . . . , τ
ε
n, . . . ;Z
ε
1 , . . . , Z
ε
n, . . .) ∈ A,
namely, any strategy such that Jx(Z
ε) ≤ v(x) + ε. If we denote by Zε,j ∈ Aj the strategy
obtained by Zε by setting τ εj+1+k =∞ for all k ≥ 1, then
v(x) + ε ≥ E
[
λ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt(Xεt )
2 dt+
∞∑
n=1
e−δτ
ε
n
(
1 + κ(Zεn)
α
)]
= Jx(Z
ε,j) + E
[
λ
∫ ∞
τεj
e−δt
[
(Xεt )
2 − (Xτεj +Wt)2
]
dt+
∞∑
n=j+2
e−δτ
ε
n
(
1 + κ(Zεn)
α
)]
.
Combining this observation with the limits
0 ≤ lim
j→∞
E
[
λ
∫ ∞
τεj
e−δt(Xεt )
2 dt+
∞∑
n=j+2
e−δτ
ε
n
(
1 + κ(Zεn)
α
)]
≤ lim
j→∞
E
[
λ
∫ ∞
τεj
e−δt(Xετεj +Wt)
2 dt
]
= lim
j→∞
E
[
e−δτ
ε
j
(
λ
δ
(Xετεj )
2 +
λ
δ2
)]
= 0,
which follow from the fact that limj→∞ τ εj = ∞, we can see that limj→∞wj(x) ≤ v(x) + ε.
It follows that limj→∞wj(x) ≤ v(x) because ε has been arbitrary.
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